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Abstract
We introduce a new matching design for financial transactions in an electronic market. In
this mechanism, called ad-hoc electronic auction design (AHEAD), market participants can
trade between themselves at a fixed price and trigger an auction when they are no longer
satisfied with this fixed price. In this context, we prove that a Nash equilibrium is obtained
between market participants. Furthermore, we are able to assess quantitatively the relevance
of ad-hoc auctions and to compare them with periodic auctions and continuous limit order
books. We show that from the investors’ viewpoint, the microstructure of the asset is usually
significantly improved when using AHEAD.
Keywords: Market microstructure, market design, financial regulation, ad-hoc auctions, periodic
auctions, limit order book, Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
1.1 Existing market models: Continuous limit order book and periodic
auctions
The question of a suitable market microstructure enabling an exchange to ensure satisfactory con-
ditions for trading activities of market participants is particularly intricate. The most standard
approach, adopted by a large number of exchanges, is the continuous limit order book (CLOB for
short). In this setting, market participants can either choose to trade immediately by accepting
the price offered by a counterparty in the order book (sending what is called an aggressive order
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and thereby reducing the quantity of shares instantly available in the limit order book) or place a
passive order, which waits in the order book to find a counterparty. The recent change in the very
nature of market makers, which are nowadays essentially high frequency traders, has triggered a
debate on whether CLOBs are the most suitable order matching mechanism, notably in terms of
quality of the price formation process. The alternative design which is usually put forward is that
of periodic auctions. In this case, transactions occur once the auction terminates. The traded price
is the equilibrium price maximising the number of financial instruments traded, determined at the
end of the auction period from the imbalance between buy and sell orders accumulated during the
duration of the auction. Currently, some auctions are already held at regular intervals in many
markets where the main mechanism is a CLOB, typically at the beginning and at the end of the
trading day. Moreover, some exchanges organise periodic auctions throughout the day. This is for
example the case of BATS-Cboe for European equities.
One of the benefits of auctions derives from the fact that they mechanically slow down the market.
Doing so, they suppress some obvious flaws due to speed competition of high frequency market mak-
ers in a CLOB environment. This is particularly well emphasized in Farmer and Skouras (2012);
Aquilina et al. (2020) and the influential paper Budish et al. (2015) where a lower bound for auction
duration so that speed arbitrages vanish is provided (about 100 ms). In the paper Du and Zhu
(2017), the authors also consider the issue of determining a suitable time period for the auction
duration. To do so, they model the behaviour of microscopic agents who optimise their demand
schedules with respect to the available information in the market. They show that the optimal
auction duration is linked to the rate of arrival of information.
Regarding a suitable market design, each type of market participants has a different view on the
question depending on its activity. This is why there is a crucial need for a quantitative analysis
enabling us to assess and compare the different mechanisms objectively. This is done in Jusselin et al.
(2019) where the authors extend the works Fricke and Gerig (2018) and Garbade and Silber (1979).
More precisely, they are able to compare CLOBs and periodic auctions from a price formation
process viewpoint using stochastic differential games. They also provide optimal auction durations
(a few minutes in practice according to their approach, depending on the asset involved).
1.2 Going AHEAD
Auctions and CLOB represent two quite orthogonal approaches in terms of market design. In
this paper, we aim to study an hybrid mechanism that we call ad-hoc electronic auction design
(AHEAD). The idea of ad-hoc auctions is to organise a specific type of continuous trading session
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after each auction. During the continuous session, market participants trade between themselves at
a fixed price equal to the last auction’s clearing price. Any market participant has the opportunity
to end the continuous session when he is no longer satisfied with the price by triggering a new
auction. The only constraint imposed by the exchange to market participants for triggering a new
auction phase is to commit at least a minimal volume in the auction. In this setting, there can
be two reasons to motivate investors for ending the continuous phase. Either they consider the
trading price is no longer reasonable or they are not able to trade at this price because of the lack
of counterparty from other participants. Our underlying idea for the relevance of this mechanism
is that it can provide the best of both worlds, interpolating between CLOB and periodic auctions,
by conveying information about a potential price change to all market participants in a timely
manner. On the one hand, auction phases enable market participants to source liquidity through
a competitive process of price formation. On the other hand, potential local volume disequilibria
between the needs of buyers and sellers that do not warrant a price change can be mitigated during
the continuous sessions.
Note that we focus here on AHEAD implementation on non-fragmented markets, such as small and
mid-cap markets (some of these stocks may display a limited fragmentation, however discussions
towards the revision of MiFID II in Europe indicate the will of the regulator to impose a unique
structure for such assets). In this case, AHEAD could be a decisive model since it improves liquid-
ity aggregation. Furthermore, an auction on an illiquid instrument ending without any transaction
would still deliver a change in the clearing price of the instrument. Direct listings, where building
steadily liquidity is the key success factor, represent another situation where AHEAD could prove
worthwhile and allow easier access to the financial markets for the small and mid-cap enterprises.
Competition between two AHEAD markets could result in something closer to a more stable version
of a CLOB: in phases where both venues can trade on a fixed price, there would be situations where
one venue would display liquidity at a “bid” and the other venue at an “offer” (depending on the
chosen make-take fees schedule)1. In highly fragmented markets, CLOBs and auctions interact by
catering to different strategies from market participants. It would be very complex to model such
interactions if AHEAD were to be added to the current microstructure, since the market participant
mix would probably differ considerably from one venue to another. Such study is left for further
research.
We consider three agents in our model: two investors, one buyer and one seller, using aggressive
orders and one market maker using passive orders. The market maker provides liquidity during
1It would then be critical for the regulator to prevent a “race to the bottom” between competing venues by setting
minimum values for the triggering quantities and the auction durations, as MiFID II did for the tick size.
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both the continuous and auction phases. During the continuous phases, he accepts transactions
at the last auction’s clearing price provided they are profitable. To assess the profitability of a
transaction, the market maker compares the last clearing price and the current efficient price, that
is assumed to be observed/built by him continuously2. Our buyer (resp. seller) investor wishes to
buy (resp. sell) a given amount of shares over a given time period. More specifically, we consider
that he aims at following a trading intensity target (coming for example from an Almgren-Chriss
type algorithm, see Almgren and Chriss (2001)). Thus his goal is to optimise his PnL while staying
close to the target. From a mathematical viewpoint, his objective function consists into two terms
that he wants to minimise: one measuring his realized trading costs and the other the deviation
from the target. To achieve their goal, our investors have access to two controls: the trading rate
with which they send their market orders and the triggering times of the auctions. They optimise
simultaneously and without communication their strategies. Note that there are of course more
than two investors in an actual market. However, since our auction period will be quite short, we
expect in practice only a small number of investors to take part in each auction (these investors
being probably different from one auction to the other). Note also that, in a live market environ-
ment, participants are not restricted to aggressive orders and also compete through passive orders:
in an AHEAD market, an aggressive order greater than the liquidity waiting for execution in the
order book would become a passive order for the remainder of the order.
In this model, we show that the market admits a Nash equilibrium. This implies that ad-hoc
auctions are a viable design as a trading mechanism. Furthermore, from our theoretical results,
we can build a numerical methodology enabling us to compute the optimal strategies and value
functions of the investors under various market configurations. This is not only done in the ad-hoc
auction framework but also under CLOB and periodic auction markets. This allows us to provide
a quantitative assessment of the AHEAD market from the investors’ viewpoint and to compare it
with the CLOB and periodic auction structures.
1.3 AHEAD contribution
Our main findings are the following. First AHEAD seems to be systematically preferable than
CLOBs from a market taker perspective. This is somehow in line with the results in Budish et al.
(2015); Jusselin et al. (2019) which underline the relevance of auctions compared to CLOBs. Fur-
thermore, based on our computations of the value functions, we conclude that for a large investor,
ad-hoc auctions are always a suitable design (even compared with periodic auctions), in particular
when the other investor is smaller. It enables the large investor to execute part of his orders with
2In a further study, the model could be developed to allow the market maker to manage its inventory by triggering
auctions himself and investors to use both passive and aggressive orders.
4
the market maker and to launch auctions when he really needs to do so. In addition to that, thanks
to the transactions executed with the market maker during the continuous phase, he reduces its
volume imbalance with respect to the smaller investor during the auctions phases. For a small
investor, strategic considerations play an important role in the comparison between ad-hoc and
periodic auctions. Essentially, if a small investor is still large enough to be able to trigger auctions
without too much relative cost, the ad-hoc auction mechanism is beneficial for him. Otherwise,
periodic auctions are more attractive from this investor’s viewpoint. In practice, in an actual mar-
ket, the smaller investor could in fact even place passive orders and hence profit from the market
impact generated by the larger one. Therefore a very small investor may prefer periodic auctions
on instruments with high price viscosity/long queuing time because, in that case, the larger one
cannot benefit from the continuous phase to reduce his volume imbalance in comparison to the
smaller investor, leading to very favourable auction clearing prices for the latter.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the ad-hoc auction mechanism and our
model. We introduce in Section 3 the notion of equilibrium in our framework and provide results
about the existence of such equilibrium under various types of assumptions. Numerical experiments
and economic insights can be found in Section 4. The proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
In this section, we introduce our model for a market with ad-hoc auctions. We build our mathe-
matical framework and explain how our market participants (the two market takers and the market
maker) interact. Then we describe the objectives of those participants in terms of optimisation
problems.
2.1 Framework
Let T > 0 be a final horizon time, h > 0 the auction’s duration, Ωc the set of continuous functions
from [0, T + h] into R, Ωd the set of piece-wise constant ca`dla`g functions from [0, T + h] into N,
and Ω = Ωc × (Ωd)2 with corresponding Borel algebra F . The observable state is the canonical
process (Wt, N˜
a
t , N˜
b
t )t∈[0,T+h] on the measurable space (Ω,F) defined for any t ∈ [0, T + h] and ω =
(w, na, nb) ∈ Ω by
Wt(ω) := w(t), N˜
a
t (ω) := n
a(t), N˜ bt (ω) := n
b(t),
with canonical completed filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T+h] = (F ct ⊗ (Fdt )⊗2)t∈[0,T+h].
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The trading universe is reduced to a single risky asset with observable efficient price P ∗ given by
P ∗t := P
∗
0 + σWt, t ∈ [0, T + h],
with initial price P ∗0 > 0 and constant volatility σ > 0. The probability measure on Ω will be
defined so that W is a Brownian motion. The efficient price is to be understood as a benchmark
price that market participants use to measure their trading costs by comparing it with the price
they get in their actual transactions, see for example Delattre et al. (2013); Robert and Rosenbaum
(2011); Stoikov (2018). The processes N˜a and N˜ b will correspond to the quantities of orders sent
by our two investors.
2.2 The market takers
We consider two investors (market takers) sending aggressive orders only. We call them Player a
and Player b. Player a only sends buy market orders while Player b only sends sell market orders.
Let λ− > 0 be the minimum intensity of arrival of orders and λ+ > λ− the maximum intensity. We
equip our filtered space with the probability PW ⊗ PN where PW is the Wiener measure and PN is
the solution to the martingale problem (in the sense of Jacod and Shiryaev (1987))
Mt = (N˜
a
t , N˜
b
t )
T − tL0 with L0 = (λ0, λ0)T , 0 < λ0 < λ+, t ∈ [0, T + h]
on ((Ωd)
2,B((Ωd)2), ((Fdt )⊗2)t∈[0,T+h]).
In our model, Player a and Player b control the intensities of buy and sell orders respectively. The
set of admissible controls denoted by U is defined by all predictable processes with values in [λ−, λ+].
For any pair (λa, λb) of admissible controls, we associate Pλa,λb the measure defined by
dPλa,λb
dP
∣∣∣∣
t
= Ψλ
a,λb
t ,
where Ψλ
a,λb
t is the Doleans-Dade exponential martingale given by
Ψλ
a,λb
t = exp
(∫ t
0
(
log(
λas
λ0
)dN˜as − (λas − λ0)ds+ log(
λbs
λ0
)dN˜ bs − (λbs − λ0)ds
))
.
Thus, under the measure Pλa,λb , the processes (N˜as −
∫ s
0
λaudu)0≤s≤T+h, (N˜
b
s −
∫ s
0
λbudu)0≤s≤T+h are
martingales and (Ws)0≤s≤T is still a Brownian motion independent of the processes (N˜a, N˜ b). In
the following, we denote by Eλa,λb the expectation under Pλa,λb and we write Ψλ
a,λb
s,t = Ψ
λa,λb
t /Ψ
λa,λb
s
for s ≤ t.
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The market takers can trigger an auction and we focus on analysing the market and the behaviours
of the participants until the end of the auction. We do not consider successive auction phases as
it would lead to important additional technical difficulties. Furthermore, we may expect that in
practice, under AHEAD, the market would be quite regenerative from one phase to the other. We
write Ts,t with 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T + h for the set of stopping times taking values in [s, t] and denote by
τa and τ b in T0,T the stopping times chosen by Player a and Player b respectively. An auction starts
at time τ = τa ∧ τ b, considering that if no player triggers an auction before time T , an auction is
automatically triggered at time T .
Let (τ, τ˜) ∈ T 20,T+h be such that τ ≤ τ˜ , P−a.s. and λ ∈ U . We denote by λ[τ,τ˜ ] and U[τ,τ˜ ] the
restriction of λ, respectively U , to [τ, τ˜ ]. For any λ ∈ U and µ ∈ U[τ,T+h], we set (λ ⊗τ µ)u :=
λu1u≤τ + µu1τ<u, u ≤ T + h.
Finally, we introduce a mechanism which forces the market taker who initiates an auction to trade
a minimal amount in it. This is obviously because from an exchange or regulator viewpoint, only
meaningful auctions are relevant. This means auctions should take place when the price P is no
longer satisfactory. Requiring a minimal traded volume tends to make the auction clearing price go
against the market participant who has triggered the auction. Consequently, one triggers an auction
when really needed. This can also be seen as a constraint or a cost associated with triggering an
auction, where the market participant considers this cost is less than the cost of waiting with a
passive order placed in the order book. Thus we assume that a fixed given number of orders nˆ ∈ N
is automatically recorded by the exchange for a player triggering an auction. In case both players
triggers at the same time (which will be unlikely but possible in theory in our discrete setting), we
write nˆab for this number. We define two Fτ -measurable random variables, Na+ and N b+, representing
the number of orders automatically recorded by the exchange for Player a and Player b when the
auction starts, that is
Na+ =nˆ1τa<τb,τa<T + nˆab1τa=τb<T
N b+ =nˆ1τb<τa,τb<T + nˆab1τa=τb<T .
Remark 2.1. In practice, in a continuous-time market, the two players would of course never
trigger an auction at the same time as the matching engine needs anyway to process one message
first. It is actually a straightforward extension to consider the case where for Player a, nˆab is
replaced by a random variable taking values 0 or nˆ with probability 0.5 and for Player b by nˆ minus
this variable. We will actually consider such situation in the numerical results of Section 4 but keep
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nˆab for simplicity for the theoretical developments. In addition, note that we can very well think of a
situation where the exchange would let participants trigger auctions only at some (frequent) specific
times.
2.3 The market makers
2.3.1 Continuous trading phase
Let P ∈ R be a price fixed at t = 0. During the continuous phase, at time t, the market maker
accepts an order from Player a (buy order) if P > P ∗t . In this case, a unit quantity is traded at price
P . Symmetrically, he accepts an order from Player b (sell order) if P < P ∗t and then a unit quan-
tity is traded at price P . In other words, at time t during the continuous trading phase, Player a
pays P1P>P ∗t dN˜
a
t to buy 1P>P ∗t dN˜
a
t , while Player b earns P1P<P ∗t dN˜
b
t from the selling of 1P<P ∗t dN˜
b
t .
We introduce the processes Na and N b describing the number of orders sent by Player a and Player
b which are not rejected by the market maker. They are defined by
Nat =
∫ t
0
(1s≤τ1P>P ∗s + 1s>τ )dN˜
a
s , N
b
t =
∫ t
0
(1s≤τ1P<P ∗s + 1s>τ )dN˜
b
s .
2.3.2 Auction
During the auction, the market maker is willing to buy or sell a given quantity at a certain price.
We consider that he provides a mid-price, that we naturally take equal to P ∗τ+h and a slope K ∈ R,
meaning that he offers a volume K(p−P ∗τ+h) at time τ + h when the auction price is p ∈ R. Player
a sends Naτ+h−Naτ +Na+ buy market orders during the auction and Player b sends N bτ+h−N bτ +N b+
sell market orders. So and similarly to Jusselin et al. (2019), the auction clearing price P auc fixed
at the clearing time τ + h is solution of the equation which equals supply and demand:
0 = −K(P auc − P ∗τ+h) + (Naτ+h −Naτ +Na+)− (N bτ+h −N bτ +N b+)
i.e.
P auc = P ∗τ+h +
(Naτ+h −Naτ +Na+)− (N bτ+h −N bτ +N b+)
K
. (1)
Thus, at the end of the auction, Player a buys Naτ+h − Naτ + Na+ units at price P auc and Player b
sells N bτ+h −N bτ +N b+ units at price P auc.
Remark 2.2. One could think the market maker should rather take a mid-price equal to ±∞ if
Naτ+h−Naτ +Na+ ≶ N bτ+h−N bτ +N b+ to optimise his PnL. However, in a real market, market makers
send limit orders over a bounded price interval and competition between them prevents them from
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displaying irrealistic prices. Also, there is in practice uncertainty on the traded volumes (notably
because auctions durations are slightly randomised). High uncertainty would lead to a high value of
K to compensate the lack of information on (Naτ+h −Naτ +Na+)− (N bτ+h −N bτ +N b+).
2.4 Objectives
Both market takers wish to optimise their PnL per unit of time. We suppose that they compare
the prices they get to the efficient price P ∗ seen as a benchmark. Moreover, they aim at trading a
certain number of assets per unit of time (respectively va and vb units per second) and have to pay
penalties if they do not reach those targets. We now give an explicit decomposition of their trading
costs per unit of time.
2.4.1 Costs during the continuous trading phase
As explained above, we assume that our two players are penalised during the continuous market
phase if they do not trade the right volumes. More precisely, during the continuous market phase,
we consider the costs of Player a and Player b are respectively given for any t ∈ [0, T + h] by
Lat = q
∫ t∧τ
0
(vas−Nas )2ds+
∫ t∧τ
0
(P − P ∗t )1P>P ∗t dNat
Lbt = q
∫ t∧τ
0
(vbs−N bs )2ds−
∫ t∧τ
0
(P − P ∗t )1P<P ∗t dN bt .
(2)
The first term of these equations, where q > 0, represents the penalty if the number of trades
does not match the targeted value and the second one is the cost resulting from trading activities
compared to the benchmark price P ∗.
Remark 2.3. We could also compute the actual trading costs instead of the costs with respect to
the efficient price, replacing P − P ∗t by P in (2).
2.4.2 Costs during the auction
We now turn to the costs Player a and Player b are subjected to during the auction. We assume
again that both players are penalised during the auction if they do not trade at the rate va and vb
respectively. The penalty here is also quadratic with parameter q > 0. Thus the penalties of Player
a and Player b during the auction are respectively given by
Caauc = qh(va(τ + h)−Naτ+h −Na+)2 and Cbauc = qh(vb(τ + h)−N bτ+h −N b+)2.
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As in Jusselin et al. (2019), the cost resulting from trading activities of market taker a is given
by Naτ,τ+h(P
auc − P ∗τ+h) while the gain of b resulting from his trades is N bτ,τ+h(P auc − P ∗τ+h), where
Naτ,τ+h = N
a
τ+h −Naτ +Na+ and N bτ,τ+h = N bτ+h −N bτ +N b+.
Putting together all the costs/gains of our market takers and using Equation (1), we get that the
total cost of Player a per unit of time is given by
Laτ + Caauc +Naτ,τ+h(P auc − P ∗τ+h)
τ + h
=
Laτ + Caauc +
Naτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+h
K
τ + h
while the gain of Player b is
−Lbτ − Cbauc +N bτ,τ+h(P auc − P ∗τ+h)
τ + h
=
−Lbτ − Cbauc +
Nbτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+h
K
τ + h
,
where we set ∆Nτ,τ+h = N
a
τ,τ+h − N bτ,τ+h. For x0 ∈ R+ × N × N × R × R and a pair of controls
((τa, λa), (τ b, λb)), let
Ja(x0, (τ
a, λa), (τ b, λb)) = Eλa,λb
[Laτ + Caauc + Naτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+hK
τ + h
∣∣(P ∗0 , Na0 , N b0 , La0, Lb0) = x0] (3)
and
J b(x0, (τ
a, λa), (τ b, λb)) = Eλa,λb
[−Lbτ − Cbauc + Nbτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+hK
τ + h
∣∣(P ∗0 , Na0 , N b0 , La0, Lb0) = x0]. (4)
Since Player a aims at minimising his cost, his goal is to minimise over (τa, λa) the objective function
Ja(x0, (τ
a, λa), (τ b, λb)) (5)
where (τ b, λb) are controlled by Player b. Symmetrically, since Player b aims at maximising his gain,
his goal is to maximise over (τ b, λb) the objective function
J b(x0, (τ
a, λa), (τ b, λb)) (6)
where (τa, λa) are controlled by Player a.
Remark 2.4. Using Lemma C.1 from Jusselin et al. (2019) and the fact that τ ≤ T and h > 0, we
obtain that (3) and (4) are well-defined and finite.
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3 Nash equilibrium for pure and mixed stopping games
In this section, we investigate the existence of an equilibrium in the optimisation problems of the
market takers in the sense of Nash equilibrium adapted to our framework. We start by defining the
notion of open-loop Nash equilibrium in the sense of Carmona and Delarue (2018). Then we show
that restraining the set of stopping times to those taking values in a finite set allows us to build
an equilibrium in the simple case n˜ = n˜ab = 0 and in the general case by considering generalized
stopping times.
3.1 Open-loop Nash equilibrium
First we define the notion of open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3.1 (Open-Loop Nash Equilibrum (OLNE)). Given x0 ∈ R+ ×N×N×R×R, we say
that the pair of controls ((τa,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) is an open-loop Nash equilibrum of the game (OLNE
for short) if Ja(x0, (τa,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) ≤ Ja(x0, (τa, λa), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) ∀(τa, λa) ∈ T0,T × UJ b(x0, (τa,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) ≥ J b(x0, (τa,∗, λa,∗), (τ b, λb)) ∀(τ b, λb) ∈ T0,T × U .
We now define a Nash equilibrium for the auction phase.
Definition 3.2 (Open-loop Nash equilibrium for the τ−sub-game). Given x ∈ R+×N×N×R×R
and τ ∈ T0,T , we say that the pair of controls (µa,∗, µb,∗) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the
τ -sub-game if
Eµa,∗,µb,∗τ
[
Caauc +
Naτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+h
K
]
= inf
µa∈U[τ,T+h]
Eµa,µb,∗τ
[
Caauc +
Naτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+h
K
]
Eµa,∗,µb,∗τ
[
− Cbauc +
Nbτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+h
K
]
= sup
µb∈U[τ,T+h]
Eµa,∗,µbτ
[
− Cbauc +
Nbτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+h
K
]
,
where Eτ [·] := E[·|(P ∗τ , Naτ , N bτ , Laτ , Lbτ ) = x].
If an open-loop Nash equilibrium exists for the τ -sub-game, we write ξ
a
τ = Eµ
a,∗,µb,∗
τ
[
Caauc +
Naτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+h
K
]
ξbτ = Eµ
a,∗,µb,∗
τ
[
− Cbauc +
Nbτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+h
K
] (7)
for the payoff of the sub-game (where a given open-loop Nash equilibrium for the τ -sub-game is
chosen).
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Similarly to the results of Hamade`ne and Mu (2014); Jusselin et al. (2019), we know that there
exists an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the τ−sub-game (7). Thanks to a dynamic programming
argument, we can show that we can start by finding optimal controls for the sub-game starting
at τ and that an OLNE for the game provides an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the sub-game
corresponding to the auction phase. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Let x0 ∈ R+ × N × N × R × R. For any τ ∈ T0,T , there exists at least one
open-loop Nash equilibrium (µa,∗, µb,∗) to the τ -sub-game. Moreover, we can find two determinis-
tic functions with polynomial growth ga, gb such that ξaτ = g
a(Naτ − vaτ,N bτ − vbτ,Na+, N b+) and
ξbτ = g
b(Naτ − vaτ,N bτ − vbτ,Na+, N b+).
Finally, if ((τa,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) is an OLNE for the general game, then the following dynamic
programming principle holds
Ja(x0, (τ
a,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) = inf
τa∈T0,T ,λa∈U[0,τ ]
Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ+ξaτ
τ+h
]
J b(x0, (τ
a,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) = sup
τb∈T0,T ,λb∈U[0,τ ]
Eλa,∗,λb
[−Lbτ+ξbτ
τ+h
] (8)
where τ = τa,∗ ∧ τ b,∗ and (λa,∗[τ,T+h], λb,∗[τ,T+h]) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the τ -sub-game (7)
(with payoffs ξaτ and ξ
b
τ), recalling that (λ
a,∗
[τ,T+h], λ
b,∗
[τ,T+h]) is the restriction of (λ
a,∗, λb,∗) to [τ, T +h].
Proof. See Appendix A.
It will be useful to consider the functions defined on [0, T ]×N×N and for l =a or l =b associated
to the value of the sub-game for Player l when
• he initiates the auction alone:
gfirstl (s, na, nb) = g
l(na − vas, nb − vbs, nˆ1l=a, nˆ1l=b),
• he does not initiate the auction:
gsecondl (s, na, nb) = g
l(na − vas, nb − vbs, nˆ1l=b, nˆ1l=a),
• he initiates it at the same time as the other player:
gsiml (s, na, nb) = g
l(na − vas, nb − vbs, nˆab, nˆab),
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• the auction starts at T :
gTl (s, na, nb) = g
l(na − vas, nb − vbs, 0, 0).
Note that from Proposition 3.1, we know that these functions have polynomial growth.
Remark 3.1. To build an OLNE for the general game, we can start by building an equilibrium for
the sub-game (7) during the auction and then look for a solution to the problem (8).
Remark 3.2. The uniqueness of an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the τ− sub-game (7) played
during the auction is known to be a very intricate issue, see Hamade`ne and Mu (2014); Jusselin et al.
(2019). However, numerical experiments seem to indicate that there is only one Nash equilibrium
for the sub-game for each value of (P ∗τ , N
a
τ − vaτ,N bτ − vbτ,Na+, N b+).
Extending the results of Aı¨d et al. (2020) and Basei et al. (2019) to include jump processes and
expectations given by non-trivial risk measures, we can prove that the existence of an OLNE can
be reduced to solving a system of fully coupled integro-partial PDEs. We refer to Appendix B for
more details on it. However, we do not expect to obtain the existence of an OLNE in this case in
a general setting. Nevertheless, as we will see below, assuming that the players can choose their
stopping time only in a set of discrete times allows us to derive the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in this slightly simplified setting.
From now on, we focus on stopping times with values in a discrete subset of [0, T ].
3.2 Discretised stopping games
We look for an OLNE in the case where the stopping times can only take discrete values. Set
δ ∈ R+ such that T
δ
∈ N. For k = 0, ..., T
δ
, we consider T dkδ,T the set of stopping times with values
in the set {kδ, (k + 1)δ, ..., T} almost surely. Note that T d(k+1)δ,T is included in T dkδ,T .
Remark 3.3. The following results can be easily extended to the case where the stopping times take
values in any finite discrete set.
For any l ∈ J0, T/δ − 1K and (λk)k∈Jl,T/δ−1K ∈ U[lδ,(l+1)δ] × ...× U[T−δ,T ], we set⊗
k∈Jl,T/δ−1Kλk := 1lδ≤t≤(l+1)δλl +
∑
k∈Jl+1,T/δ−1K 1kδ<t≤(k+1)δλk.
Following Hamade`ne and Mu (2014) and Jusselin et al. (2019), we can show that there exists a
Nash equilibrium between two fixed discrete times as formalised in the next lemma.
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Lemma 3.1. Let k ∈ J1, T/δK, gˆak and gˆbk be two measurable functions defined on [0, T + h]× R×
R2 × N2 to R, with polynomial growth. Then, their exists (λak−1, λbk−1) ∈ U2[(k−1)δ,kδ] such that
Eλ
a
k−1,λ
b
k−1
(k−1)δ
[
gˆak(kδ, P
∗
kδ, L
a
kδ, L
b
kδ, N
a
kδ, N
b
kδ)
]
= ess inf
λa∈U[(k−1)δ,kδ]
Eλ
a,λbk−1
(k−1)δ
[
gˆak(kδ, P
∗
kδ, L
a
kδ, L
b
kδ, N
a
kδ, N
b
kδ)
]
Eλ
a
k−1,λ
b
k−1
(k−1)δ
[
gˆbk(kδ, P
∗
kδ, L
a
kδ, L
b
kδ, N
a
kδ, N
b
kδ)
]
= ess sup
λb∈U[(k−1)δ,kδ]
Eλ
a
k−1,λ
b
(k−1)δ
[
gˆbk(kδ, P
∗
kδ, L
a
kδ, L
b
kδ, N
a
kδ, N
b
kδ)
]
.
In the spirit of Ludkovski (2010), we will show the following results:
• In the case where the triggering cost is null or small enough so that it does not impact the
strategies during the auction, see Section 3.2.2, we can always construct a Nash equilibrium
by backward induction (see Theorem 3.1).
• In the general case, see Section 3.2.3, we can construct a Nash equilibrium if we extend our
probability space to allow for randomised stopping times, see Theorem 3.2.
• In both cases, the pure open-loop Nash equilibrium or randomised open-loop Nash equilibrium
of the discretised game is an -Nash equilibrium of the continuous game, see Section 3.2.4.
3.2.1 Discretised game
We now introduce the notion of discretised game and that of Nash equilibrium in this framework.
Definition 3.3 (Pure Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium for the discrete game (OLNED)). Let x ∈
R+ × N × N × R × R. We say that ((τa,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) ∈ (T d0,T × U)2 is a pure open-loop Nash
equilibrium of the discretised game (OLNED for short) if it is a solution to the game

Eλa,∗,λb,∗
[Laτ + Caauc +Naτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+hK
τ + h
]
= inf
τa∈T d0,T ,
λa∈U
Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ˜a + Caauc +Naτ˜a,τ˜a+h∆Nτ˜a,τ˜a+hK
τ˜a + h
]
Eλa,∗,λb,∗
[−Lbτ − Cbauc +N bτ,τ+h∆Nτ,τ+hK
τ + h
]
= sup
τb∈T d0,T ,
λb∈U
Eλa,∗,λb
[−Lb
τ˜b
− Cbauc +N bτ˜b,τ˜b+h
∆N
τ˜b,τ˜b+h
K
τ˜ b + h
]
a.s., with τ˜a = τa∧τ b,∗, τ˜ b = τa,∗∧τ b, τ = τa,∗∧τ b,∗ and where E[·] := E[·|(P ∗0 , Na0 , N b0 , La0, Lb0) = x].
For sake of simplicity, a pure OLNED will be simply called an OLNED. Inspired by the literature on
optimal stopping in non-zero sum games in discrete time, see among others Grigorova and Quenez
(2017); Riedel and Steg (2017), we aim at finding OLNED in the sense of the above definition.
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3.2.2 Particular case: nˆ = nˆab = 0, no cost to trigger the auction
We first consider the simple case nˆ = nˆab = 0. In this situation, there is no cost associated with the
triggering of an auction and market takers are indifferent about stopping the game first or second.
We will see that here a Nash equilibrium for the discretised game can be constructed explicitly.
For (τa, τ b) ∈ (T d0,T )2, if Player b’s stopping time is τ b, then the value of Player a is the same whether
he plays τa or τa ∧ τ b. Symmetrically, the value of Player b is the same whether he plays τ b or
τa ∧ τ b. So we can simply consider strategies where both players stop at the same time. We look
for a stopping time τ ∗ ∈ T d0,T and trading intensities (λa,∗, λb,∗) ∈ U2 such that Ja(x0, (τ ∗, λa,∗), (τ ∗, λb,∗)) ≤ Ja(x0, (τa, λa), (τ ∗, λb,∗)) ∀(τa, λa) ∈ T d0,T × UJ b(x0, (τ ∗, λa,∗), (τ ∗, λb,∗)) ≥ J b(x0, (τ ∗, λa,∗), (τ b, λb)) ∀(τ b, λb) ∈ T d0,T .× U
for x0 ∈ R+ × N× N× R× R.
We build by backward induction a process (Uak , U
b
k)k∈J0,T/δK, adapted to the discrete filtration
(Fδk)k∈{0,1,...,T/δ∈N} so that, for each k ∈ {0, 1, ..., T/δ ∈ N}, Uak and U bk are the values of Player
a and Player b at time kδ when they both play an OLNED.
Backward induction algorithm. We formally construct by backward induction an OLNED.
We start by setting
(UaT/δ, U
b
T/δ) = (
LaT + g
first
a (T,N
a
T , N
b
T )
T + h
,
−LbT + gfirstb (T,NaT , N bT )
T + h
)
and
τ ∗T
δ
= T.
Since the players are forced to enter an auction if they have not started one before time T and
because nˆ = nˆab = 0, these values are those of the game if the players start playing at time T . In
this case, they play a Nash equilibrium during the auction denoted by (λˆa, λˆb) by solving (7), which
we can compute with the same numerical method as in Jusselin et al. (2019).
In the interval (T − δ, T ], the players cannot trigger an auction. From Lemma 3.1, we find
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(λa,∗T
δ
−1, λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1) ∈ U2[T−δ,T ] such that
E
λa,∗T
δ
−1,λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1
T−δ
[
UaT/δ
]
= ess inf
λa∈U[T−δ,T ]
E
λa,λb,∗T
δ
−1
T−δ
[
UaT/δ
]
E
λa,∗T
δ
−1,λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1
T−δ
[
U bT/δ
]
= ess sup
λb∈U[T−δ,T ]
E
λa,∗T
δ
−1,λ
b
T−δ
[
U bT/δ
]
.
We set λ˜a,∗T
δ
−1 := λ
a,∗
T
δ
−1 ⊗T λˆa and λ˜
b,∗
T
δ
−1 := λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1 ⊗T λˆb.
At time T−δ, both players can choose whether to trigger an auction or not. Also, they are indifferent
about who actually triggers the auction. If one of the players triggers an auction the values become
(
LaT−δ+g
first
a (T−δ,NaT−δ,NbT−δ)
T−δ+h ,
−LbT−δ+gfirstb (T−δ,NaT−δ,NbT−δ)
T−δ+h ). Otherwise, if none of the players triggers an
auction, their values are (E
λa,∗T
δ
−1,λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1
T−δ
[
UaT/δ
]
,E
λa,∗T
δ
−1,λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1
T−δ
[
U bT/δ
]
). So each player compares the two
possible values (i.e. the two possible mean payoffs) and triggers an auction if and only if it is
beneficial to him. Consequently, if the following condition is satisfied:E
λa,∗T
δ
−1,λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1
T−δ
[
UaT/δ
]
<
LaT−δ+g
first
a (T−δ,NaT−δ,NbT−δ)
T−δ+h
E
λa,∗T
δ
−1,λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1
T−δ
[
U bT/δ
]
>
−LbT−δ+gfirstb (T−δ,NaT−δ,NbT−δ)
T−δ+h .
,
then none of the players triggers an auction and we set
(UaT/δ−1, U
b
T/δ−1) = (E
λa,∗T
δ
−1,λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1
T−δ
[
UaT/δ
]
,E
λa,∗T
δ
−1,λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1
T−δ
[
U bT/δ
]
)
and
τ ∗T
δ
−1 = τ
∗
T
δ
.
Otherwise
(UaT/δ−1, U
b
T/δ−1) = (
LaT−δ + g
first
a (T − δ,NaT−δ, N bT−δ)
T − δ + h ,
−LbT−δ + gfirstb (T − δ,NaT−δ, N bT−δ)
T − δ + h ),
in which case the players trigger an auction at T − δ and so
τ ∗T
δ
−1 = T − δ.
Then we iterate the procedure to build Ua and U b and (τ ∗, λ˜a,∗), (τ ∗, λ˜b,∗) at any discrete time:
Using again backward induction, we can show that, for every k ∈ J0, T/δK, there exist two functions
gak and g
b
k such that U
a
k = gˆ
a
k(kδ, P
∗
kδ, L
a
kδ, L
b
kδ, N
a
kδ, N
b
kδ) and U
b
k = gˆ
b
k(kδ, P
∗
kδ, L
a
kδ, L
b
kδ, N
a
kδ, N
b
kδ). It
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is indeed true for k = T/δ. Then, using a result from Jusselin et al. (2019), we have that if this
property holds for some k ∈ J1, T/δK, it also holds for k − 1. This allows us to apply the previous
methodology and find appropriate (λa,∗k , λ
b,∗
k ) on each interval. As a result (τ
∗, λ˜a,∗), (τ ∗, λ˜b,∗) is an
OLNED. This backward induction is summed up in Algorithm 1, see Appendix D.
Existence of an OLNED. The following theorem formalizes this procedure.
Theorem 3.1. Let Ua, U b, λa,∗, λb,∗ be defined by the backward induction in Algorithm 1 and set
τ ∗ = δ inf
{
l ∈ J0, T/δK, Ual = Lalδ + gfirsta (lδ, Nalδ, N blδ)lδ + h or U bl = −Lblδ + gfirstb (lδ, Nalδ, N blδ)lδ + h }.
Let λ˜a,∗ =
(⊗
l∈J0,T/δ−1K λa,∗l )⊗τ∗ λˆa and λ˜b,∗ = (⊗l∈J0,T/δ−1K λb,∗l )⊗τ∗ λˆb. Then, the pair of controls
((τ ∗, λ˜a,∗), (τ ∗, λ˜b,∗)) is an OLNED. In this case, Ua0 and U
b
0 are the values of the discretised game
for Player a and Player b respectively, i.e.
Ua0 = inf
τa∈T d0,T ,λa∈U
Eλa,λ˜b,∗
[Laτ + Caauc + Naτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ + h
]
where τ = τa ∧ τ ∗ and
U b0 = sup
τb∈T d0,T ,λb∈U
Eλ˜a,∗,λb
[−Lbτ − Cbauc + Nbτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ + h
]
where τ = τ ∗ ∧ τ b.
Proof. See Appendix C.1
Remark 3.4. Note that the condition nˆ = nˆab = 0 is sufficient but not necessary to obtain Theorem
3.1. A weaker condition is actually gfirsti = g
second
i = g
sim
i for i = a, b.
Note that at each time kδ, k ∈ J0, T
δ
− 1K, the players deal with a 2× 2 game in which they decide
whether or not they trigger an auction. The values of this game are represented in Table 1.
The choice dictated by the algorithm implies a Nash equilibrium for each of those 2× 2 games. In
this setting, the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the general case (without imposing nˆ = nˆab = 0)
is much more intricate to get. However, we can obtain such result if we consider randomised
strategies. This leads us to the notion of randomised discrete stopping times as explained below.
3.2.3 General case: randomised discrete stopping times
We now consider the general case. The procedure used to build a Nash equilibrium in Section 3.2.2
can be adapted to construct a Nash equilibrium in the general case. This can be done if we look
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a
b
stops continues
stops (
Lakδ+g
first
a
kδ+h
,
−Lbkδ+gfirstb
kδ+h
) (
Lakδ+g
first
a
kδ+h
,
−Lbkδ+gfirstb
kδ+h
)
continues (
Lakδ+g
first
a
kδ+h
,
−Lbkδ+gfirstb
kδ+h
) (Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
,Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
U bk+1
]
)
Table 1: Cost/gain for Player a/b depending on whether Player a/b stops or not the discrete game
played at time kδ.
for generalized stopping times instead of classical stopping times. We refer to Coquet and Toldo
(2007); Solan et al. (2012); Touzi and Vieille (2002) for various optimal stopping problems dealing
with this kind of stopping times.
Informal derivation of a mixed Nash equilibrium. Right after T−δ and until T , the situation
is the same as in the case where nˆ = nˆab = 0. The players cannot trigger an auction so they play
a Nash equilibrium (with no stopping allowed) until T . In that case, their values right after T − δ
are (Eλ
a,∗,λb,∗
T−δ
[
UaT/δ
]
,Eλ
a,∗,λb,∗
T−δ
[
U bT/δ
]
). At time T − δ, they are allowed to trigger an auction. The
payoffs depend now on which player triggers an auction.
• If Player a triggers an auction and Player b does not, the values are
(
LaT−δ + g
first
a (T − δ,NaT−δ, N bT−δ)
T − δ + h ,
−LbT−δ + gsecondb (T − δ,NaT−δ, N bT−δ)
T − δ + h ).
• If Player b triggers an auction and Player a does not, the values are
(
LaT−δ + g
second
a (T − δ,NaT−δ, N bT−δ)
T − δ + h ,
−LbT−δ + gfirstb (T − δ,NaT−δ, N bT−δ)
T − δ + h ).
• If both players trigger an auction, the values are
(
LaT−δ + g
sim
a (T − δ,NaT−δ, N bT−δ)
T − δ + h ,
−LbT−δ + gsimb (T − δ,NaT−δ, N bT−δ)
T − δ + h ).
• Finally, if none of the players trigger an auction the values are
(Eλ
a,∗,λb,∗
T−δ
[
UaT/δ
]
,Eλ
a,∗,λb,∗
T−δ
[
U bT/δ
]
).
Contrary to the previous case, there is some advantage to gain when the other player triggers an
auction. Let piT
δ
−1 = 1 if Player i = a, b triggers an auction at T − δ and 0 otherwise. For pbT
δ
−1
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fixed, paT
δ
−1 must be a minimiser of
p ∈ {0, 1} 7−→ p pbT
δ
−1
LaT−δ + g
sim
a
T − δ + h + p(1− p
b
T
δ
−1)
LaT−δ + g
first
a
T − δ + h + (1− p)p
b
T
δ
−1
LaT−δ + g
second
a
T − δ + h
+ (1− p)(1− pbT
δ
−1)E
λa,∗k ,λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1
T−δ
[
UaT/δ
]
,
while for paT
δ
−1 fixed, p
b
T
δ
−1 must be a maximiser of
p ∈ {0, 1} 7−→ paT
δ
−1p
−LbT−δ + gsimb
T − δ + h + p
a
T
δ
−1(1− p)
−LbT−δ + gsecondb
T − δ + h + (1− p
a
T
δ
−1)p
−LbT−δ + gfirstb
T − δ + h
+ (1− paT
δ
−1)(1− p)E
λa,∗k ,λ
b,∗
T
δ
−1
T−δ
[
U bT/δ
]
.
Such optimisers might not always exist or might not be unique (in the sense that we would have to
decide who triggers the auction). However, both players can always find probabilities of stopping pa
and pb in [0, 1] such that, if Player b triggers an auction with probability pb, the optimal probability
of stopping for Player a is pa, and conversely, if Player a triggers an auction with probability pa,
the optimal probability of stopping for Player b is pb. Additionally, it is often more natural to
consider probabilities of stopping, in particular in the frequent case where both (pa, pb) = (1, 0) and
(pa, pb) = (0, 1) are possible pure Nash equilibria. This describes a mixed Nash equilibrium and
simply corresponds to a solution of the convexification of the above problem.
There are multiple equivalent notions of random times which stop according to some probability.
We use here the notion of mixed stopping times of Laraki and Solan (2005, 2010) to build our
probability space.
Definition 3.4 (Generalized stopping time). A generalized stopping time is a measurable function
µ : Ω× [0, 1]→ [0, T ] such that for Λ-almost every r ∈ [0, 1], where Λ denotes the Lebesgue measure,
the function ω → µ(ω, r) is a stopping time, i.e. µ(., r) ∈ T0,T .
Our probability space then becomes (Ω × [0, 1] × [0, 1],P ⊗ Λ ⊗ Λ) where the first extension char-
acterizes the randomiser of Player a’s stopping time and the second one that of Player b’s stopping
time. Let 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . We denote by T ∗s,t the set of generalized stopping times with values in
[s, t]. If s/δ ∈ N and t/δ ∈ N, we also denote by T ∗,ds,t the set of generalized stopping times with
values in Js, tK.
We also extend the definition of Nash equilibrium in this framework.
Definition 3.5 (Mixed OLNE and mixed OLNED). Let x ∈ R+ × N × N × R × R. We say that
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((τa,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) ∈ (T ∗0,T ×U)× (T ∗0,T ×U), resp. (T ∗,d0,T ×U)× (T ∗,d0,T ×U), is a mixed OLNE,
resp. mixed OLNED, if it is a solution to the game
Eλa,∗,λb,∗
[Laτ˜a + Caauc + Naτ˜a,τ˜a+h∆Nτ˜a,τ˜a+hK
τ˜a + h
]
= inf
τa∈T ∗0,T ,
λa∈U
Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ˜a + Caauc + Naτ˜a,τ˜a+h∆Nτ˜a,τ˜a+hK
τ˜a + h
]
Eλa,∗,λb,∗
[−Lb
τ˜b
− Cbauc +
Nb
τ˜b,τ˜b+h
∆N
τ˜b,τ˜b+h
K
τ˜ b + h
]
= sup
τb∈T ∗0,T ,
λb∈U
Eλa,∗,λb
[−Lb
τ˜b
− Cbauc +
Nb
τ˜b,τ˜b+h
∆N
τ˜b,τ˜b+h
K
τ˜ b + h
]
resp.
Eλa,∗,λb,∗
[Laτ˜a + Caauc + Naτ˜a,τ˜a+h∆Nτ˜a,τ˜a+hK
τ˜a + h
]
= inf
τa∈T ∗,d0,T ,
λa∈U
Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ˜a + Caauc + Naτ˜a,τ˜a+h∆Nτ˜a,τ˜a+hK
τ˜a + h
]
Eλa,∗,λb,∗
[−Lb
τ˜b
− Cbauc +
Nb
τ˜b,τ˜b+h
∆N
τ˜b,τ˜b+h
K
τ˜ b + h
]
= sup
τb∈T ∗,d0,T ,
λb∈U
Eλa,∗,λb
[−Lb
τ˜b
− Cbauc +
Nb
τ˜b,τ˜b+h
∆N
τ˜b,τ˜b+h
K
τ˜ b + h
]
with τ˜a = τa∧τ b,∗, τ˜ b = τa,∗∧τ b, τ = τa,∗∧τ b,∗ and where E[·] := EP⊗Λ⊗Λ[·|(P ∗0 , Na0 , N b0 , La0, Lb0) = x].
It is known (see for example Shmaya and Solan (2014); Solan et al. (2012); Touzi and Vieille
(2002)) that our notion of generalized stopping time is equivalent to the notion described in the
informal derivation of a mixed Nash equilibrium above, where, at time t, each player stops with
some probability based on the information Ft. In particular, we can build a mixed OLNED using
the same algorithm as in Section 3.2.2, see Algorithm 2 in Appendix D.
Existence of a (mixed) OLNED. More formally, the following theorem based on the backward
induction above provides the existence of a mixed OLNED.
Theorem 3.2. Let τa,∗(., r) = δ inf
{
l ∈ J0, T/δK, 1−∏lk=0(1− pal ) ≥ r)}
τ b,∗(., r) = δ inf
{
l ∈ J0, T/δK, 1−∏lk=0(1− pbl ) ≥ r)}
where pa and pb are the discrete Ft-adapted processes given by Algorithm 2 in Appendix D. Let λ˜a,∗ =⊗
(λa,∗l )l∈J0,T/δ−1K⊗τ∗ λˆa and λ˜b,∗ = ⊗(λb,∗l )l∈J0,T/δ−1K⊗τ∗ λˆb, where the quantities on the r.h.s of the
equalities are also given in Algorithm 2 in Appendix D. Then the strategies ((τa,∗, λ˜a,∗), (τ b,∗k , λ˜
b,∗))
describe a mixed OLNED.
Proof. According to Shmaya and Solan (2014) and Solan et al. (2012), optimising over the set of
generalized stopping times is equivalent to optimising over the set of adapted processes pa and pb
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describing the probability to stop at each discrete time. Then Theorem 1 in Shmaya and Solan
(2014) gives a way to build the generalized stopping times from the probability processes. The rest
of the proof is similar to that in the pure case and thus follows the proof of Theorem 3.1. The only
difference is that the players must play the game of Table 2 when choosing whether to stop at kδ
or continue playing until (k + 1)δ.
a
b
stops continues
stops (
Lakδ+g
sim
a
kδ+h
,
−Lbkδ+gsimb
kδ+h
) (
Lakδ+g
first
a
kδ+h
,
−Lbkδ+gsecondb
kδ+h
)
continues (
Lakδ+g
second
a
kδ+h
,
−Lbkδ+gfirstb
kδ+h
) (Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
,Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
U bk+1
]
)
Table 2: Cost/gain for Player a/b depending on whether Player a/b stops or not the discrete game
played at time kδ.
Thus, at time kδ, pak and p
b
k are defined as solutions of the following linear optimisation problems.
For pbk fixed, Player a chooses
pak ∈ arg inf
p∈[0,1]
{
p pbk
Lakδ + g
sim
a
kδ + h
+ p(1− pbk)
Lakδ + g
first
a
kδ + h
+ (1− p)pbk
Lakδ + g
second
a
kδ + h
+ (1− p)(1− pbk)Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]}
,
while for pak fixed, Player b chooses
pbk ∈ arg sup
p∈[0,1]
{
pakp
−Lbkδ + gsimb
kδ + h
+ pak(1− p)
−Lbkδ + gsecondb
kδ + h
+ (1− pak)p
−Lbkδ + gfirstb
kδ + h
+ (1− pak)(1− p)Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
U bk+1
]}
.
From classical results, see for instance Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947); Nash (1950), we
know that the two problems above can be solved simultaneously3. Solving for a mixed equilibrium
yields the following result:
3It would no longer be the case in general with p ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. with pure stopping times, although it works if
nˆ = nˆab = 0 as we have seen before.
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
pak =
Lakδ+g
first
a
kδ+h
− Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
−Lakδ+gsima
kδ+h
+
Lakδ+g
first
a
kδ+h
+
Lakδ+g
second
a
kδ+h
− Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
pbk =
−Lbkδ+gfirstb
kδ+h
− Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
U bk+1
]
−−Lbkδ+gsimb
kδ+h
+
−Lbkδ+gfirstb
kδ+h
+
−Lbkδ+gsecondb
kδ+h
− Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
U bk+1
]
(9)
and one can easily verify that the denominators are non-zero and that these values are in [0, 1] when
there is no pure Nash equilibrium.
Remark 3.5. The notion of probability of stopping is quite convenient for numerical computations
as we can compute the value functions and the strategies by dynamic programming.
3.2.4 Existence of ε-OLNE
In this part, we explain that the previously introduced OLNEDs (see Definition 3.3) provide good
approximations for OLNEs (see Definition 3.1), in the sense of ε-Nash equilibria.
For technical reasons we need to slightly modify the definitions of Caauc and Cbauc replacing vaτ and
vbτ by dvaτ − 1
2
e and dvbτ − 1
2
e. All the previous results could be proved in this slightly modified
setting. This assumption is crucial in this section as it enables us to have that when 1
2vaδ
∈ N and
1
2vbδ
∈ N, the functions gi,first, gi,sim, for i = a, b take the same values if we replace t by d t
δ
eδ. This
will be a key element in the proof of the next theorems.
Theorem 3.3 (OLNED and ε−OLNE). Let δ > 0 and ((τa, λa), (τ b, λb)) ∈ (T d0,T ×U)× (T d0,T ×U)
be the strategies associated to a pure OLNED starting at 0 with time-step δ. Let ε > 0. Then, for
δ small enough such that 1
2vaδ
∈ N and 1
2vbδ
∈ N,
Eλa,λb
[La
τa∧τb + ξ
a
τa∧τb
τa ∧ τ b + h
] ≤ inf
τ∈T0,T ,λ∈U
Eλ,λb
[La
τ∧τb + ξ
a
τ∧τb
τ ∧ τ b + h
]
+ ε+ εa
Eλa,λb
[−Lb
τa∧τb + ξ
b
τa∧τb
τa ∧ τ b + h
] ≥ sup
τ∈T0,T ,λ∈U
Eλa,λ
[−Lbτa∧τ + ξbτa∧τ
τa ∧ τ + h
]− ε− εb
where
εa =
1
h
sup
λa0∈U ,λb0∈U
Eλa0 ,λb0
[
sup
[0,T ]
max
(
max(gsima (t, N
a
t , N
b
t ), g
second
a (t, N
a
t , N
b
t ))− gfirsta (t, Nat , N bt ), 0
)]
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and
εb =
1
h
sup
λa0∈U ,λb0∈U
Eλa0 ,λb0
[
sup
[0,T ]
max
(
gfirstb (t, N
a
t , N
b
t )−min(gsimb (t, Nat , N bt ), gsecondb (t, Nat , N bt )), 0
)]
.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Also, this theorem extends easily to the case of mixed OLNEs and mixed OLNEDs.
Theorem 3.4 (Mixed OLNED and ε−mixed OLNE). Let δ > 0 and ((τad , λa), (τ bd , λb)) ∈ (T ∗,d0,T ×
U) × (T ∗,d0,T × U) be the strategies of a mixed OLNED starting at 0. Let ε > 0. Then, for δ small
enough such that 1
2vaδ
∈ N and 1
2vbδ
∈ N,
Eλa,λb
[La
τa∧τb + ξ
a
τa∧τb
τa ∧ τ b + h
] ≤ inf
τ∈T ∗0,T ,λ∈U
Eλ,λb
[La
τ∧τb + ξ
a
τ∧τb
τ ∧ τ b + h
]
+ ε+ εa
Eλa,λb
[−Lb
τa∧τb + ξ
b
τa∧τb
τa ∧ τ b + h
] ≥ sup
τ∈T ∗0,T ,λ∈U
Eλa,λ
[−Lbτa∧τ + ξbτa∧τ
τa ∧ τ + h
]− ε− εb. (10)
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 3.3.
In practice and in our numerical experiments, the constants εa and εb are negligible and very often
zero. This is because they are non-zero only when there is an advantage in triggering the auction
right before the other player. This is typically not the case, unless the player triggering the auction
benefits from nˆ to execute a large target volume that he could not fully do within the auction
because of its bounded intensity.
Remark 3.6. The condition on δ is only technical and ensures that the changes in the targets
happen on the same grid as the optimisation (with mesh δ). This condition would actually not be
required if the targets followed, for example, Poisson processes.
4 Numerical results and assessment of ad-hoc auctions
In this section, we provide numerical results enabling us to draw conclusions on the relevance of
ad-hoc auctions compared to CLOB and periodic auctions. We also discuss some implementation
details. The value functions shown are multiplied by 106 for more readability.
4.1 Sub-game values depending on players’ positions at the auction
triggering
First we show how the value of the sub-game played during the auction phase varies with the
parameters, for Player a and Player b. From now on we take K = 10, va = vb = 0.1.
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4.1.1 Effect of the amount traded before the auction
We fix h = 30s and plot the value of the sub-game ξaτ as a function of N
a
τ − vaτ , for various values
of Na+, with N
b
+ = 0 and N
b
τ − vbτ = 0 (see Figure 1, left side). First we notice that these graphs
are increasing with respect to Na+, which is obviously not surprising. The effect of N
a
+ gets more
important as Naτ − vaτ becomes larger. This is because in such situation, Player a is already in
advance regarding to his target. A large Na+ implies that he is even more in advance and gets
penalised via the objective function.
Looking at the graphs for fixed Na+, we see that the best context to trigger an auction is when
Nat −vat is close to zero and actually slightly negative. In that case, Player a can launch an auction
without overshooting his target at the end because of the mandatory volume Na+. Moreover, we
note that ξaτ is large when either N
a
τ − vaτ is large, since Player a is penalised for overshooting his
target, or when Naτ − vaτ is too small, since Player a has to send a lot of orders during the auction,
which makes the price increase.
Next we plot ξaτ as a function of N
b
τ − vbτ , for various values of Na+, with N b+ = 0 and Naτ − vaτ = 0
(see Figure 1, right side). We notice that ξaτ is always increasing with respect to N
b
τ − vbτ : the
more Player b trades before the auction in comparison to his target, the less he trades during the
auction, and the higher the final price of the auction is. In addition to that, ξaτ converges when
N bτ − vbτ → ±∞: if N bτ − vbτ is too large, Player b stops trading completely and if N bτ − vbτ is
too small, Player b would rather pay some penalties than send too many orders during the auction
leading to a bad price since Player a is at equilibrium when the auction starts.
Figure 1: On the left, ξaτ as a function of N
a
τ − vaτ , for different values of Na+, with N b+ = 0,
N bτ − vbτ = 0 and h = 30s. On the right, ξaτ as a function of N bτ − vbτ , for different values of Na+,
with N b+ = 0, N
a
τ − vaτ = 0 and h = 30s, q = 0.1.
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4.1.2 Impact of the risk aversion parameter and of the auction duration
We investigate the effect of the parameter q which is the factor for the penalties received by the
players for not reaching their trading targets and of the auction duration. We first consider q = 0.1
and plot on the left side of Figure 2a ξaτ as a function of h, for N
a
τ − vaτ = N bτ − vbτ = 0, N b+ = 0
and for multiple values of Na+. On the right side of Figure 2a, we display ξ
a
τ as a function of h, with
Naτ − vaτ = N bτ − vbτ = 0, Na+ = 0 and for multiple values of N b+. In Figure 2b we fix q = 0.01 and
in Figure 2c q = 0.001.
We see in Figures 2a and 2b that ξaτ = 0 for h large enough, which is no longer the case in Figure
2c. This is because when the commitment to the target is severe, over a quite long time period
both traders send on average the same number of orders as va = vb and the effect of Na+ or N
b
+
vanishes. We also observe that too short auctions may create some kind of arbitrage opportunities:
the trader who triggers an auction is committed to trade at least a given volume. The other trader
might choose to trade less to take advantage of the price imbalance in the auction, as the penalty he
will have to pay will not be too large. Let us take the example of h = 20s. In that case, the target
is two lots for both Player a and Player b. If Player a triggers the auction with Na+ = 4 then Player
b will put a volume of 2 in the auction meeting his target or perhaps even less (volume of 1) meeting
partially his target but benefiting from price impact. Such phenomenon is magnified in a situation
as in Figure 2c where the target commitment is very weak. In that case, both players try to benefit
from price impact leading to a game where they both put smaller volumes than their target. For ex-
ample, we see that the effect of the initial volume Na+ = 1 vs N
a
+ = 2 takes more than 80 seconds to
vanish in Figure 2c, although the target is 8 lots for 80s. This means that between 0 and 80 seconds,
both investors play strategically to benefit from the effect of volume imbalance on the clearing price.
This shows that the duration of the auction should be large enough and related to reasonable
practical values for q. Considering the auction duration helps to convey information to market
participants, it should also probably depend on the deviation between the previous clearing price
and the best offer price in the order book at the beginning of the auction. The larger the devia-
tion, the longer the duration of the auction. Accurate duration calibration is left for further research.
We use the results of this section to choose suitable parameters for our study of the entire ad-hoc
auction in the next section.
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(a) q = 0.1.
(b) q = 0.01.
(c) q = 0.001
Figure 2: ξaτ as a function of h, with N
a
τ − vaτ = 0, N bτ − vbτ = 0. On the left, we fix N b+ = 0 and
consider multiple values of Na+. On the right, we fix N
a
+ = 0 and consider multiple values of N
b
+.
26
4.2 Assessment of ad-hoc auctions
We now investigate the whole mechanism of ad-hoc auctions and compare it with the classical
CLOB and periodic auctions. We use Algorithm 2 with a small timestep δ = 0.05s and write V i
for J i(., (τ i,∗, λi,∗), (τ i,∗, λi,∗)) for i = a, b.
4.2.1 Choice of the parameters for the simulation study
The values for va and vb will be of order 0.1, so we expect roughly 2 trades every 10 seconds, which
corresponds to the case of reasonably liquid assets. We fix T = 100s so that T is large compared
to the average time between trades. We take q = 0.01, h = 20s and nˆ = nab = 3. The justification
for the relevance of these parameters is the following:
• We have nˆ > (va ∧ vb)h. This ensures that transactions occur both in the continuous and
auction phases. As a matter of fact, if nˆ < (va ∧ vb)h, the triggering cost for an auction is
quite negligible with respect to the target amount within the auction. We numerically observe
that in that case, investors do not use the continuous phase and trade only in the auction
phases, which means that ad-hoc auctions are reduced to periodic auctions.
• Consider an auction triggered because both players are slightly behind their targets so that
one of them, say Player a, triggers the auction and both should trade 3 lots during the 20
seconds. Then, suppose that Player b tries to benefit from the price impact and trade only 2
during the auction instead of 3. Under these parameters, the price impact benefit of Player
b (which is equal to 2 × 1/K) is exactly the cost paid for not meeting the target (which is
equal to qh). Hence from the investors’ viewpoint, these parameters correspond to reasonable
balance between trading costs and target deviation penalties.
4.2.2 Effect of nˆ compared to va and vb
Here we replace nˆab by a random variable which is so that if there is simultaneous triggering, it
is attributed to Player a or Player b with probability 1/2 and a volume commitment equal to 3.
We plot in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5 the values of the game at the origin and the average
duration4 of the continuous phase at time t = 0 for different values of va and vb.
Figure 3 : supply and demand of similar order. When va = vb = 0.1, the average duration
of the continuous phase is 21 seconds if the initial trading price P is equal to P ∗0 . We observe that
we obviously get a symmetric average duration of the continuous trading phase with respect to the
4In fact we only compute a proxy of the average duration. The computation details are given in Algorithm 3 in
Appendix D.3.
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sign of P −P ∗. The average duration of the continuous phase is maximal at P = P ∗, then decreases
and becomes stationary. This can be explained as follows: if P is close to P ∗ and because of the
symmetry of P ∗, locally around t = 0, we expect to have oscillations of P ∗ around P so that either
Player a or Player b can trade with the market maker. If P ∗ increases (resp. if P ∗ decreases) signifi-
cantly beyond P , Player b (resp. Player a) is likely to start an auction since his probability to trade
with the market maker in a short amount of time becomes smaller. Although he can trade, the other
player may also wish to trigger an auction, as his trading price becomes very unfavourable. So we see
that ad-hoc auctions ensure that the trading price does not deviate too much from the efficient price.
The plots of V a and V b in Figure 3 are not even functions with respect to P−P ∗. To explain it, take
for example the position of Player a. If P > P ∗ he can buy and launch an auction while if P < P ∗
he can only launch an auction. Consequently, the situation P > P ∗ is somehow more acceptable
for him. We recall that as Player a minimises and Player b maximises, the value functions are
symmetric with respect to the origin. We also see that for Player a, there is a large peak of the
value function when P −P ∗ is slightly negative and only a small downward bump when it is slightly
positive. This means that for Player a, there is much more to lose when Player b can trade with the
market maker than to earn when he can trade with the market maker. This will be also confirmed
in Table 3 below.
Figure 3: Values of the game and average duration of the continuous phase, at time t = 0, as
functions of P − P ∗0 , with va = vb = 0.1.
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Figure 4 : demand higher than supply for small investors. When va = 0.1 and vb = 0.05,
Player b is better off than Player a. When P > P ∗, Player a can trade with the market maker
hence reducing the imbalance with respect to the volume of Player b. Player b will typically not
immediately trigger an auction because of the quite significant entry cost of the auction nˆ = 3. This
explains the quite long duration of the auction phase in this situation and the downward peak of
the value function of Player a. When P −P ∗ is negative, Player b can trade with the market maker
which could lead to an even larger imbalance from Player a’s perspective. Thus we expect Player
a to trigger the auction in that case explaining the short length of the continuous phase and the
flat behaviour of the value functions on the left of 0 (whatever P −P ∗ < 0, Player a will trigger an
auction).
Figure 4: Values of the game and average duration of the continuous phase, at time t = 0, as
functions of P − P ∗0 , with va = 0.1 and vb = 0.05.
Figure 5 : supply higher than demand for large investors. When va = 0.1 and vb = 0.15
the situation differs significantly. When P > P ∗, as previously, Player a can trade with the market
maker, which improves even more its imbalance position with respect to the volume of Player b and
it is particularly interesting when P is only slightly larger than P ∗. In that case, Player b rapidly
triggers an auction to prevent Player a from trading. Note that contrary to the previous situation,
the entry cost is not prohibitive here for Player b as vb = 0.15. When P is significantly larger than
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P ∗, the price becomes too bad for Player a who stops trading. Then a gaming situation occurs
between the two players explaining the delay before one of them triggers the auction. Regarding
the value functions, the peak of the orange graph is explained by the fact that it is very interesting
for Player b to trade with the market maker to reduce his imbalance with respect to the volume of
Player a (who may be reluctant to trigger an auction as va is not very large).
Figure 5: Values of the game and average duration of the continuous phase, at time t = 0, as
functions of P − P ∗0 , with va = 0.1 and vb = 0.15.
4.2.3 Comparison with periodic auctions and CLOB
We finally provide the value functions and average durations in the case of ad-hoc auctions, expensive
periodic auctions (nˆ = 3 and no trading allowed in the continuous phase), inexpensive periodic
auctions (nˆ = 1 and no trading allowed in the continuous phase) and CLOB. In the case of CLOB,
the players trade only with the market maker and pay 1/K for each trade. The average duration
is then defined as the average time between two trades and the value as the amount paid per unit
of time. The results are shown in Table 3.
We notice first that, if continuous trading with the market maker is allowed, the average duration
of the pre-auction phase is longer. This is because both players try to trade with the market maker
if possible in order to push the settlement price of the next auction in their favour.
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V a (1e-6) Average duration
Market design
h = 20,
nˆ = 3
h = 20,
nˆ = 1 CLOB
h = 20,
nˆ = 3
h = 20,
nˆ = 1 CLOB
continuous trading allowed Yes No No No Yes No No No
va = 0.1, vb = 0.1 3685.6 384.6 0.0 10000.0 21.3s 6.0s 0.0s 10.0s
va = 0.05, vb = 0.1 392.8 -6666.7 -5000.0 5000.0 33.3s 10.0s 0.0s 20.0s
va = 0.1, vb = 0.05 7800.0 11606.7 10000.0 10000.0 33.3s 10.0s 0.0s 10.0s
va = 0.15, vb = 0.1 9397.9 8680.0 10000.0 15000.0 9.0s 5.0s 0.0s 6.7s
va = 0.1, vb = 0.15 -2841.8 0.0 0.0 10000.0 9.0s 5.0s 0.0s 10s
Table 3: V a and average duration of the continuous trading phase for different values of va and vb
with q = 0.01.
If va = vb = 0.1, Player a prefers the case where there is no continuous trading. This is in agree-
ment with our interpretation of Figure 3 since Player a has much more to lose when Player b can
trade with the market maker than to earn when he can trade with the market maker. Moreover, if
the triggering volume is small (nˆ = 1), the probability of the auctions to be balanced is large and
the player who cannot trade with the market maker triggers an auction quickly. The case nˆ = 3
provides an intermediary between periodic auctions and CLOB in terms of value functions.
If va and vb are small and asymmetric (either va = 0.05 and vb = 0.1 or va = 0.1 and vb = 0.05),
we observe that the player with the larger target benefits from ad-hoc auctions. We explain this as
follows: if the larger player can trade with the market maker, he is able to liquidate his temporary
surplus at a low cost with the market maker and so suffers less from price impact in the auction,
which is more balanced than in the situation without continuous trading. In this case, it is too costly
for the smaller player to trigger an auction since nˆ is too high compared to the target 0.05. The
larger player is thus the first to trigger the auction if the price becomes too unfavourable, in a way
signalling to the smaller player that it is preferable to trade at the forthcoming auction instead of
at the clearing price. Otherwise, if the smaller player trades with the market maker during the con-
tinuous trading phase, the larger player triggers the auction to protect himself from an excessively
unfavourable price at the auction. The smaller player benefits from information leakage/market
impact generated by the larger player, while the larger player uses his informational advantage of
being the larger player by capturing mistimed liquidity from the smaller player. In both cases, the
larger player is the one triggering the auction and benefits from the continuous trading phase. This
is in agreement with Figure 4 where V a takes its lowest value for P > P ∗ with P close to P ∗. In
addition, compared to the case without market maker or with |P −P ∗| large, the temporary target
imbalance has less impact on the distance between the clearing price and the efficient price. This is
a direct consequence of the surplus of orders from the larger player being absorbed by the market
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maker. We consider this an advantage of ad-hoc auctions: the clearing price has less volatility.
We now turn to va = 0.1 and vb = 0.15. As before, if Player a (smaller player) trades with the
market maker, he can liquidate part of his volume but Player b (larger player) quickly triggers
an auction to prevent him from doing so. The larger player can indeed trigger the auction since
nˆ = 3 coincides with his target. When Player b trades with the market maker, unlike the previous
case, the auction triggering cost is reasonable for Player a. The continuous phase appears as an
opportunity for Player a to prevent Player b from mitigating his inventory since in this case Player
a triggers the auction. This is in accordance with Figure 5 above. Conversely, we observe that the
value functions of Player b are quite similar considering ad-hoc auctions or classical periodic auc-
tions. One conclusion is that for large investors, the smaller one benefits a lot from ad-hoc auctions
compared to periodic auctions and CLOB, while the larger one is quite indifferent between ad-hoc
and periodic auctions.
The parameter q plays quite an important role since it dictates the probability of an auction to be
balanced out. We refer to Appendix E for the value functions and average durations with q = 0.005.
For this value of the penalties, auctions are rarely balanced and the CLOB design becomes more
relevant. In this configuration, allowing continuous trading is always beneficial if nˆ = 3 since it
mitigates price impact during the auction. The value functions are close to those observed with
periodic auctions but have the attractive property of having very long periods of continuous trading:
the price remains constant for a long time while with periodic auctions, auctions are triggered as
soon as someone needs to trade. Also the larger player still benefits a lot from being able to trade
with the market maker.
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A Proof of Proposition 3.1
The proof of the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the sub-game (7) is a direct exten-
sion of the results of Hamade`ne and Mu (2014) and Jusselin et al. (2019), taking into consideration
the continuous trading phase, together with a smooth decomposition of the value function at the
optimum.
We focus on the dynamic programming principle (8). We follow the same argument as in Cvitanic
and Karatzas (1993) Proposition 6.2 or El Euch et al. (2018) Lemma A.4. First, let us write
χa := Caauc +
Naτ,τ+h(N
a
τ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)
K
. From the definition of an OLNE, we have
Ja(x0, (τ
a,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) = inf
λa∈U[0,τ ]
Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ + χa
τ + h
]
.
Using the tower property we get
Ja(x0, (τ
a,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) = inf
λa∈U[0,τ ]
Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ + Eλa,λb,∗τ [χa]
τ + h
]
. (11)
Moreover applying Bayes’ formula leads to
Eλa,λb,∗τ [χa] = Eλ
0,λ0
τ
[Ψλa,λb,∗T+h
Ψλ
a,λb,∗
τ
χa
]
= E
λa,λb,∗
[τ,T+h]
τ [χ
a] ≥ essinf
µa∈U[τ,T+h]
E
µa,λb,∗
[τ,T+h]
τ [χ
a]. (12)
Therefore, using both (11) and (12) we obtain
Ja(x0, (τ
a,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) ≥ inf
λa∈U[0,τ ]
Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ + ξaτ
τ + h
]
. (13)
Conversely, let λa ∈ U[0,τ ] and µa ∈ U[τ,T+h]. Recalling the definition (λa⊗τ µa)u := λau1u≤τ +µau1τ<u,
we get that λa ⊗τ µa ∈ U and
Ja(x0, (τ
a,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) ≤ Ja(x0, (τa,∗, λa ⊗τ µa), (τ b,∗, λb,∗))
= Eλa⊗τµa,λb,∗
[Laτ + χa
τ + h
]
= Eλa⊗τµa,λb,∗
[Laτ + Eλa⊗τµa,λb,∗τ [χa]
τ + h
]
.
(14)
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Thus, remarking that
Ψλ
a⊗τµa,λb,∗
T+h
Ψλ
a⊗τµa,λb,∗
τ
= Ψµ
a,λb,∗
τ,T+h , we deduce
Eλa⊗τµa,λb,∗τ [χa] = E0,0τ
[
Ψµ
a,λb,∗
τ,T+h χ
a
]
= E
µa,λb,∗
[τ,T+h]
τ [χ
a].
Using Lemma A.3 of El Euch et al. (2018) (extended to stopping times), we can build a sequence
(µan)n∈N such that
E
µan,λ
b,∗
[τ,T+h]
τ [χ
a]↘ ξaτ . (15)
By the monotonous convergence theorem together with (14) and (15), we obtain
Ja(x0, (τ
a,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) ≤ inf
λa∈U[0,τ ]
Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ + ξaτ
τ + h
]
. (16)
We can prove similar results for Player b. We conclude from (13) and (16) and the corresponding
inequalities for Player b that the dynamic programming principle (8) holds.
Finally, let ((τa,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) be an OLNE. Then, from Definition 3.1, for any λa ∈ U we have
Ja(x0, (τ
a,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) ≤ Ja(x0, (τa,∗, λa), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)). (17)
Assume that there exists µa 6= λa,∗τ,T+h such that
E
µa,λb,∗
[τ,T+h]
τ
[
Caauc +
Naτ,τ+h(N
a
τ,τ+h −N bτ,τ+h)
K
]
< E
λa,∗
[τ,T+h]
,λb,∗
[τ,T+h]
τ
[
Caauc +
Naτ,τ+h(N
a
τ,τ+h −N bτ,τ+h)
K
]
.
Then
ξaτ < E
λa,∗
[τ,T+h]
,λb,∗
[τ,T+h]
τ
[
Caauc +
Naτ,τ+h(N
a
τ,τ+h −N bτ,τ+h)
K
]
.
Let λa ∈ U[0,τ ], we have
Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ + ξaτ
τ + h
]
< Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ + Eλa,∗[τ,T+h],λb,∗[τ,T+h]τ [Caauc + Naτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K ]
τ + h
]
.
Therefore
inf
λa∈U[0,τ ]
Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ + ξaτ
τ + h
]
< inf
λa∈U[0,τ ],
λat 1τ<t≤T+h=(λ
a,∗
[τ,T ]
)t
Eλa,λb,∗
[Laτ + Eλa,∗[τ,T+h],λb,∗[τ,T+h]τ [Caauc + Naτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K ]
τ + h
]
.
37
Using the dynamic programming principle (8) together with (17) we deduce
Ja(x0, (τ
a,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)) < Ja(x0, (τa,∗, λa,∗), (τ b,∗, λb,∗)),
leading to a contradiction. We have a similar result for Player b. We conclude that (λa,∗[τ,T+h], λ
b,∗
[τ,T+h])
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the sub-game (7).
B Existence of an OLNE for [0, T ]−valued stopping times:
a verification theorem
We need to extend the results of Aı¨d et al. (2020) and Basei et al. (2019) to include jump processes
and expectations given by non-trivial risk measures.
Following the ideas of Jusselin et al. (2019), we turn to the definition of the Hamiltonian related to
the optimisation of the players during the auction. For any z ∈ R2 and a, b ∈ [λ−, λ+], we set
λ∗a(z, a) =1z1>0λ− + 1z1<0λ+ + 1z1=0a
λ∗b(z, b) =1z2<0λ− + 1z2>0λ+ + 1z2=0b.
As z1λ
∗
a(z, a) and z2λ
∗
b(z, b) do not depend on a and b, we simply denote them by z1λ
∗
a(z) and
z2λ
∗
b(z). For any z, z˜ ∈ R2 and any  ∈ [λ−, λ+], we set
Ha,∗(p∗, z, z˜, ) =1p∗<P z1λ∗a(z) + 1p∗>P z2λ
∗
b(z˜, )
Hb,∗(p∗, z, z˜, ) =1p∗>P z2λ∗b(z) + 1p∗<P z1λ
∗
a(z˜, ).
We define for any j ∈ {a, b}
• Lj from [0, T ]× R× N× N× R× R+ × R+ × R× R× [λ−, λ+] into R by
Lj(t, p∗, na, nb, dt, d2, `a, `b, d, d˜, ) := dt + 1
2
σ2d2 + q
∑
i∈{a,b}
(vit− ni)2`i +Hj,∗(p∗, d, d˜, ),
where (t, p∗, na, nb, dt, d2, `a, `b, d, d˜, ) ∈ [0, T ]×N×N×R×R×R×R+×R+×R×R×[λ−, λ+].
• the function Gj from [0, T ]× R× R× N× N into R by
Gj(t, lj, na, nb) :=
βjl
j + gfirstj (t, n
a, nb)
t+ h
,
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where βj = 1j=a − 1j=b.
• for any map U : (t, p∗, la, lb, na, nb) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R+ × R+ × N× N −→ R, the domains
Γj(U) = {(t, p∗, na, nb, la, lb) ∈ [0, T )× R× N× N× R× R, βjGj > βjU},
∂Γj(U) = {(t, p∗, na, nb, la, lb) ∈ [0, T )× R× N× N× R× R, Gj = U}.
together with its derivative operators
DaU(t, p∗, la, lb, na, nb) = U(t, p∗, la + (P − p∗), lb, na + 1, nb)− U(t, p∗, la, lb, na, nb)
DbU(t, p∗, la, lb, na, nb) = U(t, p∗, la, lb + (p∗ − P ), na, nb + 1)− U(t, p∗, la, lb, na, nb)
DU = (DaU,DbU)T .
The quantity DjU describes the change in the value of the process (U(t, P ∗t , L
a
t , L
b
t , N
a
t , N
b
t ))t∈[0,T ]
when Player j, j ∈ {a, b}, sends an order which triggers a trade at the fixed price P . The set Γj(U)
is the domain on which Player j would rather have a game of value U than trigger an auction alone
(and thus have a game of value Gj). The set ∂Γj(U) is the domain on which he is indifferent. We
have the following result.
Theorem B.1. Let V a and V b be two functions of (t, p∗, la, lb, na, nb) from [0, T ]×R×R+×R+×N×N
into R. Assume that there exist two maps εa, εb from R+ × R × R+ × R+ × N × N into [λ−, λ+]
such that
(i) V a and V b are C1 in time on [0, T ) and in their third (on R) and fourth arguments (on R),
C2 in their second argument (on R), and are solutions to the following variational system:
max
{− La(t, p∗, na, nb, ∂tV a, ∂2ppV a, ∂laV a, ∂lbV a, DV a, DV b, εb), V a −Ga} = 0, on Γb(V b)
la+gseconda (t,n
a,nb)
t+h
= V a on ∂Γb(V b)
V a(T, p∗, la, lb, na, nb) = l
a+gTa (T,n
a,nb)
T+h
min
{− Lb(t, p∗, na, nb, ∂tV b, ∂2ppV b, ∂laV b, ∂lbV b, DV b, DV a, εa), V b −Gb} = 0, on Γa(V a)
−lb+gsecondb (t,na,nb)
t+h
= V b on ∂Γa(V a)
V b(T, p∗, la, lb, na, nb) = −l
b+gTb (T,n
a,nb)
T+h
.
(18)
(ii) gseconda ≤ gsima on ∂Γb(V b) and gsecondb ≥ gsimb on ∂Γa(V a).
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Then5 ((τa, λ∗a(DV
a, εa)⊗τ λˆa), (τ b, λ∗b(DV b, εb)⊗τ λˆb)) is an OLNE in the sense of Definition 3.1,
where
τa = inf{t ≥ 0, (t, P ∗t , Lat , Lbt , Nat , N bt ) ∈ ∂Γa(V a)}
τ b = inf{t ≥ 0, (t, P ∗t , Lat , Lbt , Nat , N bt ) ∈ ∂Γb(V b)}.
Remark B.1. The differentiability conditions are very strong. In a non bang-bang case, extend-
ing the results of Aı¨d et al. (2020) to the case of jump processes, it is possible to show that C1-
differentiability in the third and fourth arguments is enough if ∂Γa(V a) and ∂Γb(V b) are Lips-
chitz surfaces. Nevertheless, note that in Theorem B.1, Condition (ii) is easier to meet when
nˆ = nˆab = 0. This is because the stopping domains are allowed to intersect since for i = a, b we
have gfirsti = g
sim
i = g
second
i .
Remark B.2. Suppose that there exists a solution to System (18) and that the players play the
associated Nash equilibrium. Then, as soon as gfirsta 6= gseconda and gfirstb 6= gsecondb , necessarily we
must have
∂Γa(V a) ∩ ∂Γb(V b) = ∅,
i.e. the two players never trigger an auction at the same time. In practice, we have gfirsta 6= gseconda
and gfirstb 6= gsecondb if nˆ 6= 0 and h is not too large. Also, note that from our numerical investigations,
it seems that there is no uniqueness for the solution of System (18).
Proof of the verification theorem B.1. Suppose that the functions V a and V b satisfy the above con-
ditions with the maps εa and εb and that Player b plays the strategy (τ
b, λ∗b(DV
b, εb)⊗τ λˆb). Using
Proposition 8, we see that it is optimal for Player a to play λˆa after τ , thus obtaining ξaτ at τ . For
t ≤ τ b, we write
V a,∗t = ess inf
τa,∗∈Tt,T ,λa∈U[t,T+h]
Eλ
a,λb,∗
t
[Laτ + ξaτ
τ + h
]
.
On ∂Γb(V b), as t ≤ τ b and because of the definition of τ b, we necessarily have t = τ b. So Player b
triggers an auction, from (ii)
V a,∗t = min(
la + gseconda (t, n
a, nb)
t+ h
,
la + gsima (t, n
a, nb)
t+ h
) =
la + gseconda (t, n
a, nb)
t+ h
and Player a does not trigger an auction. On Γb(V b), necessarily t < τ b, i.e. Player b does not
trigger an auction. Player a then solves a classical optimal stopping problem. Standard dynamic
5Here λˆa and λˆb denote the strategies played by Player a and Player b during the auction given by Proposition
3.1.
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programming arguments yield the quasi-variational equality
max
{− La(t, p∗, na, nb, ∂tV, ∂2ppV, ∂laV, ∂lbV,DV,DV b, εb), V −Ga} = 0
for the value of Player a’s game. We now detail the computation of the generator La. As the
problem depends only on (t, P ∗t , N
a
t , N
b
t , L
a
t , L
b
t), Itoˆ’s formula provides the following expression
∂tV +
1
2
σ2∂2ppV + q
∑
i∈{a,b}
(vit−N it )2∂liV + inf
λa∈[λ−,λ+]
λa1P>P ∗t D
aV + λ∗b(DV
b, εb)1P<P ∗t D
bV.
The infimum is reached for λa = λ∗a(DV, ε˜a), for any ε˜a ∈ [λ−, λ+] and
λ∗a(DV, ε˜a)1P>P ∗t D
aV + λ∗b(DV
b, εb)1P<P ∗t D
bV = Ha,∗(P ∗t , DV,DV
b, εb),
which gives La.
We conclude by using classical verification arguments for mixed optimal stopping problems (see for
example Touzi (2013) or Aı¨d et al. (2020)). They enable us to show that necessarily, a classical
solution V a of this quasi-variational equality is equal to the value of Player a’s game and that
the optimal controls are given by the minimiser λa = λ∗a(DV
a, ε˜a) (for any ε˜a ∈ [λ−, λ+]) and the
stopping time
τa = inf{t ≥ 0, V a(t, P ∗t , Lat , Lbt , Nat , N bt ) ≥ Ga(t, P ∗t , Lat , Lbt , Nat , N bt )}
= inf{t ≥ 0, (t, P ∗t , Lat , Lbt , Nat , N bt ) ∈ ∂Γa(V a)}.
C Proofs of Section 3.2
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We prove by backward induction on k ∈ {T
δ
, ..., 0} that
Uak = ess inf
τa∈T dkδ,T ,λa∈U[kδ,T+h]
Eλ
a,λ˜b,∗k
kδ
[Laτ+Caauc+Naτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ+h
]
U bk = ess sup
τb∈T dkδ,T ,λb∈U[kδ,T+h]
Eλ˜
a,∗
k ,λ
b
kδ
[−Lbτ−Cbauc+Nbτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ+h
]
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and that the above extrema are reached for τa = τ b = τ ∗k , λ
a = λ˜a,∗k and λ
b = λ˜b,∗k with
τ ∗k = δ inf
{
l ∈ Jk, T/δK, Ual = Lalδ + gfirsta (lδ, Nalδ, N blδ)lδ + h or U bl = −Lblδ + gfirstb (lδ, Nalδ, N blδ)lδ + h },
λ˜a,∗k =
(⊗
l∈Jk,T/δ−1K λa,∗l )⊗τ∗ λˆa and λ˜b,∗k = (⊗l∈Jk,T/δ−1K λb,∗l )⊗τ∗ λˆb. Applying this result at k = 0
we will get that (τ ∗, λ˜a,∗), (τ ∗, λ˜b,∗) is an OLNED. For k = T/δ, the result follows directly from
Proposition 3.1. Suppose the result holds for k + 1 ∈ J1, T/δK. We show that it holds for k. We
thus assume that
Uak+1 = ess inf
τa∈T d
(k+1)δ,T
,λa∈U[(k+1)δ,T+h]
Eλ
a,λ˜b,∗k+1
(k+1)δ
[Laτ+Caauc+Naτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ+h
]
U bk+1 = ess sup
τb∈T d
(k+1)δ,T
,λb∈U[(k+1)δ,T+h]
Eλ˜
a,∗
k+1,λ
b
(k+1)δ
[−Lbτ−Cbauc+Nbτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ+h
]
.
From the definition of λa,∗k together with our induction assumption above, we have
Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1]
= ess inf
λak∈U[kδ,(k+1)δ]
Eλ
a
k,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
= ess inf
λak∈U[kδ,(k+1)δ]
Eλ
a
k,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
ess inf
τa∈T d
(k+1)δ,T
,λak+1∈U[(k+1)δ,T+h]
Eλ
a
k+1,λ˜
b,∗
k+1
(k+1)δ
[Laτ + Caauc + Naτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ + h
]]
.
(19)
We aim at showing that
ess inf
λak∈U[kδ,(k+1)δ]
Eλ
a
k,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
ess inf
τa∈T(k+1)δ,T ,λak+1∈U[(k+1)δ,T+h]
Eλ
a
k+1,λ˜
b,∗
k+1
(k+1)δ
[Laτ + Caauc + Naτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ + h
]]
= ess inf
τa∈T(k+1)δ,T ,λak∈U[kδ,T+h]
Eλ
a
k,λ˜
b,∗
k
kδ
[Laτ + Caauc + Naτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ + h
]
,
(20)
where abusing notation slightly we write τ = T ∧ τa ∧ τ ∗k+1. Let
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1 =
Laτ + Caauc +
Naτ,τ+h(N
a
τ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)
K
τ + h
and τa be in T d(k+1)δ,T . Using the tower property we get
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Eλ
a
k,λ˜
b,∗
k
kδ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]
=Eλ
a
k,λ˜
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Eλ
a
k,λ˜
b,∗
k
(k+1)δ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]]
=Eλ
a
k,λ˜
b,∗
k
kδ
[
E
λa
k,[(k+1)δ,T ]
,λ˜b,∗k+1
(k+1)δ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]]
=E
λa
k,[kδ,(k+1)δ]
,λb,∗k
kδ
[
E
λa
k,[(k+1)δ,T ]
,λ˜b,∗k+1
(k+1)δ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]]
≥Eλ
a
k,[kδ,(k+1)δ]
,λb,∗k
kδ
[
ess inf
τa∈T d
(k+1)δ,T
,λak+1∈U[(k+1)δ,T+h]
Eλ
a
k+1,λ˜
b,∗
k+1
(k+1)δ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]]
≥ ess inf
λak∈Ud[kδ,(k+1)δ]
Eλ
a
k,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
ess inf
τa∈T d
(k+1)δ,T
,λak+1∈U[(k+1)δ,T+h]
Eλ
a
k+1,λ˜
b,∗
k+1
(k+1)δ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]]
,
which gives one inequality in (20) by taking the essential infimum over τa ∈ T d(k+1)δ,T and λak ∈
U[kδ,T+h]. We now turn to the other inequality. Let λa ∈ U[kδ,(k+1)δ] and µa ∈ U[(k+1)δ,T+h]. We recall
the definition (λa ⊗(k+1)δ µa)u := λau1u≤(k+1)δ + µau1(k+1)δ<u so that λa ⊗(k+1)δ µa ∈ U[kδ,T+h]. Let
τa ∈ T d(k+1)δ,T . We have
ess inf
τa∈T d
(k+1)δ,T
,λak∈U[kδ,T+h]
Eλ
a
k,λ˜
b,∗
k
kδ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
] ≤ Eλa⊗(k+1)δµa,λ˜b,∗kkδ [χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1]
= E
λa
[kδ,(k+1)δ]
,λ˜b,∗k
kδ
[
Eµ
a,λ˜b,∗k+1
(k+1)δ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]]
.
(21)
This inequality holds for any τa ∈ T d(k+1)δ,T and µa ∈ U[(k+1)δ,T+h] and in particular for τa and µa
such that
Eµ
a,λ˜b,∗k+1
(k+1)δ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]
= ess inf
τa∈T d
(k+1)δ,T
,λak+1∈U[kδ,(k+1)δ]
Eλ
a
k+1,λ˜
b,∗
k+1
(k+1)δ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]
. (22)
From the induction hypothesis, we know that such quantities exist (we can take τ ∗k+1 and λ˜
a,∗
k+1).
Thus from (21) and (22) we have
ess inf
τa∈T d
(k+1)δ,T
,λak∈U[kδ,T+h]
Eλ
a
k,λ˜
b,∗
k
kδ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]
≤ Eλ
a
k,[kδ,(k+1)δ]
,λ˜b,∗k
kδ
[
ess inf
τa∈T d
(k+1)δ,T
,λak+1∈U[(k+1)δ,T+h]
Eλ
a
k+1,λ˜
b,∗
k+1
(k+1)δ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]]
= Eλ
a
k,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
ess inf
τa∈T d
(k+1)δ,T
,λak+1∈U[(k+1)δ,T+h]
Eλ
a
k+1,λ˜
b,∗
k+1
(k+1)δ
[
χaT∧τa∧τ∗k+1
]]
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and we deduce the second inequality in (20) by taking the essential infimum over λak ∈ Udk . From
(19) and (20) we deduce that
Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1] = ess inf
τa∈T d
(k+1)δ,T
,λak∈U[kδ,T+h]
Eλ
a
k,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[Laτ + Caauc + Naτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ + h
]
. (23)
We conclude from (23) that
ess inf
τa∈T dkδ,T ,λa∈U[kδ,T+h]
Eλ
a,λ˜b,∗k
kδ
[Laτ + Caauc + Naτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ + h
]
= min
(
Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1],
Lakδ + g
first
a (kδ, , N
a
kδ, N
b
kδ)
kδ + h
)
where τ = τa ∧ τ ∗k+1 and symmetrically
ess sup
τb∈T dkδ,T ,λb∈U[kδ,T+h]
Eλ˜
a,∗
k ,λ
b
kδ
[−Lbτ − Cbauc + Nbτ,τ+h(Naτ,τ+h−Nbτ,τ+h)K
τ + h
]
= max
(
Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
U bk+1],
−Lbkδ + gfirstb (kδ,Nakδ, N bkδ)
kδ + h
)
where τ = τ ∗k+1 ∧ τ b. So, if either
Eλ˜
a,∗
k ,λ
b
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
<
Lakδ + g
first
a (kδ,N
a
kδ, N
b
kδ)
kδ + h
or
Eλ˜
a,∗
k ,λ
b
kδ
[
U bk+1
]
>
−Lbkδ + gfirstb (kδ,Nakδ, N bkδ)
kδ + h
,
the extrema are not reached at kδ, i.e. the optimal stopping times are still equal to τ ∗k+1 and the
trading rates are given by λa,∗k ⊗(k+1)δ λa,∗k+1 = λ˜a,∗k and λb,∗k ⊗(k+1)δ λb,∗k+1 = λ˜b,∗k . Else at least one
player triggers an auction and the optimal stopping times are equal to kδ. Consequently,
τ ∗k = δ inf
{
l ∈ Jk, T/δK, Ual = Lalδ + gfirsta (lδ, Nalδ, N blδ)lδ + h or U bl = −Lblδ + gfirstb (lδ, Nalδ, N blδ)lδ + h }.
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C.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Step 1: Construction of a (good) stopping strategy. Fix τ b ∈ T0,T and λb ∈ U . Let ε > 0, λ∗ ∈ U
and τ ∗ ∈ T0,T such that
Eλ∗,λb
[La
τ∗∧τb + ξ
a
τ∗∧τb
τ ∗ ∧ τ b + h
] ≤ inf
τ∈T0,T ,λ∈U
Eλ,λb
[La
τ∧τb + ξ
a
τ∧τb
τ ∧ τ b + h
]
+ ε
and define τ ∗d = δd τ
∗
δ
e1τ∗<τb + 1τ∗≥τbτ ∗. Also let λa = λ∗ ⊗τ∗ λˆ− where λˆ− ∈ U is the constant
strategy equal to λ−.
Step 2: Comparison with the optimal payoff. We decompose the error made by choosing τ ∗d instead
of τ ∗ into three terms:
0 ≤ Eλa,λb[Laτ∗d∧τb + ξaτ∗d∧τb
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
]− inf
τ∈T0,T ,λ∈U
Eλ,λb
[La
τ∧τb + ξ
a
τ∧τb
τ ∧ τ b + h
]
≤ Eλa,λb[Laτ∗d∧τb + ξaτ∗d∧τb
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
]− Eλ∗,λb[Laτ∗∧τb + ξaτ∗∧τb
τ ∗ ∧ τ b + h
]
+ ε
= Eλa,λb
[Laτ∗d∧τb + ξaτ∗d∧τb
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
− L
a
τ∗∧τb + ξ
a
τ∗∧τb
τ ∗ ∧ τ b + h
]
+ ε
= Eλa,λb
[
1τ∗<τb(
La
τ∗d∧τb + ξ
a
τ∗d∧τb
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
− L
a
τ∗∧τb + ξ
a
τ∗∧τb
τ ∗ ∧ τ b + h )
]
+ ε
= Eλa,λb
[
1τ∗<τb(
La
τ∗d∧τb + ξ
a
τ∗d∧τb
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
− L
a
τ∗∧τb + g
first
a (τ
∗ ∧ τ b)
τ ∗ ∧ τ b + h )
]
+ ε
= Eλa,λb
[
1τ∗<τb(
La
τ∗d∧τb + g
first
a (τ
∗
d ∧ τ b, Naτ∗d∧τb , N
b
τ∗d∧τb)
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
− L
a
τ∗∧τb + g
first
a (τ
∗ ∧ τ b, Na
τ∗∧τb , N
b
τ∗∧τb)
τ ∗ ∧ τ b + h )
]
+ Eλa,λb
[
1τ∗<τb(
La
τ∗d∧τb + ξ
a
τ∗d∧τb
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
−
La
τ∗d∧τb + g
first
a (τ
∗
d ∧ τ b, Naτ∗d∧τb , N
b
τ∗d∧τb)
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
)
]
+ ε.
We have τ ∗,d− τ ∗ →
δ→0
0 a.s. Furthermore, since vaτ and vbτ are replaced by the nearest integer and
using that 1
2vaδ
∈ N and 1
2vbδ
∈ N, we get
gfirsta (τ
∗
d ∧ τ b, Naτ∗d∧τb , N
b
τ∗d∧τb) = g
first
a (τ
∗ ∧ τ b, Naτ∗d∧τb , N
b
τ∗d∧τb).
So, using that the intensities of the Poisson processes are bounded, we have
Eλa,λb
[
1τ∗<τb(
La
τ∗d∧τb + g
first
a (τ
∗
d ∧ τ b, Naτ∗d∧τb , N
b
τ∗d∧τb)
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
− L
a
τ∗∧τb + g
first
a (τ
∗ ∧ τ b, Na
τ∗∧τb , N
b
τ∗∧τb)
τ ∗ ∧ τ b + h )
] →
δ→0
0,
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uniformly in τ ∗, τ b, λa and λb. Also,
Eλa,λb
[
1τ∗<τb(
La
τ∗d∧τb + ξ
a
τ∗d∧τb
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
−
La
τ∗d∧τb + g
first
a (τ
∗
d ∧ τ b, Naτ∗d∧τb , N
b
τ∗d∧τb)
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
)
]
≤ 1
h
Eλa,λb
[
max(0, ξaτ∗d∧τb − g
first
a (τ
∗
d ∧ τ b, Naτ∗d∧τb , N
b
τ∗d∧τb))
]
≤ 1
h
sup
λa0∈U ,λb0∈U
Eλa0 ,λb0
[
sup
[0,T ]
(max(max(gsima (t, N
a
t , N
b
t ), g
second
a (t, N
a
t , N
b
t ))− gfirsta (t, Nat , N bt ), 0))
]
= εa.
Step 3: Conclusion. We have shown that for any ε > 0, there exists δˆa > 0 such that, if δ ≤ δˆa,
then for any τ b and λb chosen by Player b, we can find some τ ∗d ∈ T0,T and λa ∈ U such that
0 ≤ Eλa,λb[Laτ∗d∧τb + ξaτ∗d∧τb
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
]− inf
τ∈T0,T ,λ∈U
Eλ,λb
[La
τ∧τb + ξ
a
τ∧τb
τ ∧ τ b + h
] ≤ 2ε+ εa.
Now let ((λa, λb), (τa, τ b)) be an OLNED for some δ < δˆa and let τ ∗d ∈ T0,T and λa ∈ U as in Step
1. Remark that τ ∗d ∈ T d0,T and so
0 ≤ Eλa,λb[Laτa∧τb + ξaτa∧τb
τa ∧ τ b + h
]− inf
τ∈T0,T ,λ∈U
Eλ,λb
[La
τ∧τb + ξ
a
τ∧τb
τ ∧ τ b + h
]
= inf
τ∈T d0,T ,λ∈U
Eλ,λb
[La
τ∧τb + ξ
a
τ∧τb
τ ∧ τ b + h
]− inf
τ∈T0,T ,λ∈U
Eλ,λb
[La
τ∧τb + ξ
a
τ∧τb
τ ∧ τ b + h
]
≤ Eλa,λb[Laτ∗d∧τb + ξaτ∗d∧τb
τ ∗d ∧ τ b + h
]− inf
τ∈T0,T ,λ∈U
Eλ,λb
[La
τ∧τb + ξ
a
τ∧τb
τ ∧ τ b + h
]
≤ 2ε+ εa.
Similarly, we find δˆb > 0 such that if ((λa, λb), (τa, τ b)) is an OLNED for some δ < δˆb, then
0 ≤ sup
τ∈T0,T ,λ∈U
Eλa,λ
[−Lbτa∧τ + ξbτa∧τ
τa ∧ τ + h
]− Eλa,λb[−Lbτa∧τb + ξbτa∧τb
τa ∧ τ b + h
] ≤ 2ε+ εb.
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D Algorithms
D.1 Value functions when nˆ = nˆab = 0
Algorithm 1: Computation of the value functions in the discretised game
Result: Value functions and probability of triggering an auction
Set
(UaT/δ, U
b
T/δ) = (
LaT + g
T
a (T, P
∗
T , N
a
T , N
b
T )
T + h
,
−LbT + gTb (T, P ∗T , NaT , N bT )
T + h
)
for k ∈ {T/δ − 1, ..., 0} do
Let (λa,∗k , λ
b
k) ∈ U2k such that
Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
= ess inf
λa∈U[kδ,(k+1)δ]
Eλ
a,λb,∗k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
U bk+1
]
= ess sup
λb∈U[kδ,(k+1)δ]
Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b
kδ
[
U bk+1
]
,
if Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1
] ≤ Lakδ+gfirsta (kδ,P ∗kδ,Nakδ,Nbkδ)
kδ+h
and Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
U bk+1
] ≥ −Lbkδ+gfirstb (kδ,P ∗kδ,Nakδ,Nbkδ)
kδ+h
then
Set (Uak , U
b
k) = (E
λa,∗k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
,Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
U bk+1
]
)
else
Set (Uak , U
b
k) = (
Lakδ+g
first
a (kδ,P
∗
kδ,N
a
kδ,N
b
kδ)
kδ+h
,
−Lbkδ+gfirstb (kδ,P ∗kδ,Nakδ,Nbkδ)
kδ+h
)
end
end
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D.2 Value functions in the general case: randomised discrete stopping
time
Algorithm 2: Computation of the value functions in the discretised game
Result: Value functions and probability of triggering an auction
Set
(UaT/δ, U
b
T/δ) = (
LaT + g
T
a (T, P
∗
T , N
a
T , N
b
T )
T + h
,
−LbT + gTb (T, P ∗T , NaT , N bT )
T + h
)
for k ∈ {T/δ − 1, ..., 0} do
Let
• (λa,∗k , λ
b,∗
k ) ∈ U2k such that
Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
= ess inf
λa∈U[kδ,(k+1)δ]
Eλ
a,λb,∗k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
U bk+1
]
= ess sup
λb∈U[kδ,(k+1)δ]
Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b
kδ
[
U bk+1
]
,
• (pak, pbk) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that (pak, 1− pak) and (pbk, 1− pbk) define the mixed strategies
of a Nash equilibrium for the discrete game of Table 2.
SetU
a
k = p
a
kp
b
k
Lakδ+g
sim
a
kδ+h
+ pak(1− pbk)L
a
kδ+g
first
a
kδ+h
+ (1− pak)pbk L
a
kδ+g
second
a
kδ+h
+ (1− pak)(1− pbk)Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Uak+1
]
U bk = p
a
kp
b
k
−Lbkδ+gsimb
kδ+h
+ pak(1− pbk)−L
b
kδ+g
second
b
kδ+h
+ (1− pak)pbk−L
b
kδ+g
first
b
kδ+h
+ (1− pak)(1− pbk)Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
U bk+1
]
where the arguments of the functions gfirsta , g
second
a , g
sim
a , g
first
b , g
second
b and g
sim
b are
(kδ, P ∗kδ, N
a
kδ, N
b
kδ).
end
D.3 Average duration of the continuous trading phase
The average duration is defined by
Ek = E
λa,∗k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
τ − kδ|τ ≥ kδ]
for k ∈ {0, ..., T/δ}. In particular E0 = Eλa,∗,λb,∗ [τ ]. Assuming that it is a Markovian function of the
state variables P ∗, Na, N b, La, Lb and that the PDE obtained from the Feyman-Kac formula has a
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unique solution, we compute Ek with the following algorithm.
Algorithm 3: Computation of the average duration of the continuous phase in the discre-
tised game
Result: Average duration of the continuous phase
Set
ET/δ = 0
for k ∈ {T/δ − 1, ..., 0} do
Compute Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Ek+1
]
with the Feyman-Kac formula: Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Ek+1
]
= ekδ where e
is the solution of the equation
e(k+1)δ = Ek+1
∂te+
σ2
2
∂2ppe+ 1 + q(v
at− na)2∂lae+ q(vbt− nb)2∂lbe+ 1P>pλa,∗,kt Dae+ 1P<pλb,∗,kt Dbe = 0
for t ∈ [kδ, (k + 1)δ)
Set
Ek = (1− pak)(1− pbk)Eλ
a,∗
k ,λ
b,∗
k
kδ
[
Ek+1
]
end
We recall that the operators Da, Db are defined in Appendix B as the change in the value functions
due to a trade between Player a and the market maker, and Player b and the market maker,
respectively. Also, ∂la and ∂lb are the spatial derivatives with respect to the cash processes L
a and
Lb of Player a and Player b.
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E Comparison ad-hoc auctions, periodic auctions and CLOB
for small penalty
V a (1e-6) Average duration
Market design
h = 20,
nˆ = 3
h = 20,
nˆ = 1 CLOB
h = 20,
nˆ = 3
h = 20,
nˆ = 1 CLOB
continuous trading allowed Yes No No No Yes No No No
va = 0.1, vb = 0.1 16458.6 27424.3 12000.5 10000.0 40.9s 5.6s 0.0s 10.0s
va = 0.05, vb = 0.1 6533.5 11581.1 2000.5 5000.0 56.9s 14.9s 0.0s 10.0s
va = 0.1, vb = 0.05 14196.4 22874.1 12000.5 10000.0 56.9s 14.9s 0.0s 20.0s
va = 0.15, vb = 0.1 27287.7 30051.5 31501.0 15000.0 27.1s 3.9s 0.0s 6.7s
va = 0.1, vb = 0.15 16450.0 16309.9 9510.7 10000.0 27.1s 3.9s 0.0s 10.0s
Table 4: V a and average duration of the continuous trading phase for different values of va and vb
with q = 0.005.
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